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ABSTRACT 
 
Newton, Jason R. M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon. June 2005. 
Consumer Health Benefits Through Agricultural Biotechnology: An Economic 
Examination of Obstacles to Commercial Introduction.  
Supervisor: Dr. Jill E. Hobbs 
 
The first generation of agricultural crops developed using biotechnology have 
offered the primary producers of the crops agronomic benefits. Some consumers have 
resisted accepting this technology because of concerns with food and environmental 
safety, and ethical issues that arise from the processes that are involved in developing 
these products. The second and third generation of agricultural biotechnology are being 
developed to offer products with direct benefits to consumers. The focus of this thesis is 
the second generation, which have added health benefits. Specifically, the obstacles to 
commercialization of functional foods derived through biotechnology are examined. 
The three factors which have the potential to set back commercial introduction of 
functional foods derived through biotechnology are government regulatory uncertainty, 
consumer aversion and brand risk, and gaining access to intellectual property. The 
regulations governing functional foods are examined to show the regulatory ambiguity 
that exists in Canada. Comparisons are drawn to other nations. Literature that focuses on 
consumer aversion to agricultural biotechnology is reviewed, along with consumer 
preference studies with regards to genetically modified (GM) foods with and without 
health benefits. Transaction cost economics literature is used to analyse the problems 
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related to gaining access to intellectual property and the resulting supply chain 
implications. 
Three separate theoretical models are developed to examine each of the three 
factors separately. Government regulatory uncertainty is incorporated into an expected 
profit model to show the effects of increased uncertainty on the expected profit from a 
new technology. A heterogeneous consumer preference model is used to show the effects 
of changing consumer preferences on the market share of the firm introducing the GM 
functional food to the market. Simulation analysis using this model shows the effects of 
changing variables on the market shares of three products in the market. Finally a stylized 
model of the vertical market shows the effects of increased transaction costs incurred in 
gaining access to intellectual property on the rent that is available for distribution 
throughout the supply chain. 
The results show that these factors could be an obstacle to commercial 
development of functional foods derived through biotechnology. When the three factors 
are combined, the rent available for distribution is important for the success of the supply 
chain. Multiple bilateral monopoly negotiations cause this rent to be less than optimal. 
Increased levels of government regulatory uncertainty, consumer aversion and brand risk, 
and costs gaining of access to intellectual property decrease the expected rent available 
for distribution. This could be a problem facing developers of functional foods derived 
through biotechnology. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Agricultural production in western Canada and throughout the world has 
traditionally been commodity based. Researchers have consistently made improvements 
to crops through breeding techniques that lead to higher crop yields. Ceteris paribus, the 
increased yield leads to higher production levels and a downward trend in prices. The 
grain handling industry has adapted to be able to handle the large volumes of 
homogenous grain. Consistent improvements in technology reacting to this trend have led 
to the low cost bulk grain production and handling that exists in North America today. 
One of the major trends that is occurring in food markets is a greater demand 
from consumers for food safety and quality. As a result of the scientific community 
gaining an increased understanding of the links between diet and disease prevention, 
consumers have begun to demand certain health attributes from their food (Health 
Canada, 2001). Demand for specific health attributes in food has been made possible by 
increased levels of consumer income. Stronger consumer preferences have led to a shift 
away from the traditional minimum cost commodity production. Producers and 
manufacturers are now attempting to gain returns from differentiation and specialization 
to fill niche markets.  
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Consumer concerns for food safety have been shown towards foods that are 
produced from genetically modified (GM) crops. These crops have been modified 
through transgenics, which is the transfer of genes from one species to another. 
Widespread aversion to these crops, especially in the European Union (EU) has shown 
that consumers are concerned with credence characteristics in the food they eat. Certain 
credence characteristics can be used by firms for product differentiation, though the 
characteristic cannot be identified by the consumer before, during or after consumption 
(Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001). In the case of GM crops, some consumers believe that 
the safety of these crops has been inadequately proven (both food and environmental), 
have other ethical problems with the methods used in the process of modification, or they 
simply distrust the influence of large multinational corporations on what they eat (Hobbs 
and Plunkett, 1999). These consumers would not necessarily be appeased if the price of 
GM foods were lower. They tend to support labelling GM foods and segregating them 
from those products that are GM free. 
The aversion to the first generation of GM foods, which solely contain input 
traits, is logical in many ways because the consumers are not receiving a significant 
portion of the benefit from the technology. Moschini (2001) states that theoretically 44% 
of the economic efficiency gains from Roundup Ready Soybeans go to the seed 
innovators. The consumers in this model gain 40% through a price decrease and the 
producers 16% of the total efficiency gains. However, these are potential benefits not 
considering consumer preferences, and the actual price benefit passed on to the 
consumers. Gaisford et al. (2001) provide the explanation that the demand reduction from 
the adverse quality effect outweighs the beneficial price effect from the adoption of GM 
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crops. There has been little calculation of price effects caused directly from 
biotechnology; however, a high consumer aversion combined with a low price effect 
could lead to a net consumer loss from biotechnology (Giannakas and Fulton, 2004). It 
could be argued that many consumers are unaware of the potential environmental and 
health benefits from less pesticide use from producing GM crops, and lower 
contamination by fungal spore development resulting from insect damage (TFILSI, 
2004). Although these benefits may be largely unrecognised by consumers, future 
generations of GM foods promise traits that directly appeal to the consumer market. 
The second and third generation of GM products are being created to contain 
output traits that give additional benefits to consumers. The second generation of GM 
crops includes functional foods and nutraceuticals or natural health products (NHPs). 
There is potential for developments in GM functional foods and NHPs1 to provide 
products that offer additional health benefits to consumers. Functional foods and NHPs 
exist currently that are not GM, but GM technology has the potential to enhance 
functional traits in conventional foods, and produce new NHPs. These range from omega-
3 fatty acids in oilseeds, to non-allergenic peanuts, to plant-produced pharmaceuticals 
that can be produced at a potential cost advantage relative to those produced from animal 
cell cultures. For this reason, plant produced pharmaceuticals may allow for cheaper 
provision of pharmaceutical products to consumers.  
The preferences of consumers are important factors to determine the feasibility of 
the next generation of GM foods. The preferences of consumers towards GM foods have 
been well documented. Some studies have specifically assessed consumer willingness to 
                                                        
1 Products considered to be nutraceuticals are regulated in Canada under the broad category of Natural 
Health Products 
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pay for GM functional foods (Larue et al., 2004; Lusk et al., 2002). Both of these studies 
showed that consumers had a willingness to pay a premium for GM foods that offered 
consumers functional characteristics. 
However, individual consumer preferences change over time because of increased 
knowledge and information. Firms responsible for the introduction of GM functional 
foods may realize that new product introductions based on current consumer perceptions 
carry risk. For this reason, firms may be concerned with the potential impact on their 
entire brand offering caused by positive or negative consumer experience with the new 
food. 
The potential benefits of the second generation of GM products have been 
emphasized by lifescience firms for several years. It is known that these products have 
been under development for some time. However, the failure of any significant entry of 
GM functional foods to the market suggests that there may be additional problems 
preventing the commercialization of these products. The supply chain relationships for 
GM functional foods and NHPs are substantially more complicated than those in 
traditional foods. In order to further develop new products based on existing 
technologies, firms could be required to purchase licenses to access the technology or 
genetic resource. Throughout this thesis, this will be referred to as gaining access to 
intellectual property. In the case of the first generation GM products this has been 
relatively simple because there is normally a single critical transgene involved. In the 
case of the second generation of GM foods, there could be several critical transgenes 
involved. For each critical transgenic manipulation, licenses may have to be negotiated 
for the promoter, selectable marker, transformation method and the expressing protein of 
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interest.2 The increase in intellectual property in the second generation of GM foods 
means that the search and negotiation costs could become quite high because of multiple 
negotiations. Also, the distribution of rents becomes a concern when multiple monopolies 
are involved in the negotiations. The problems negotiating the distribution of rents in this 
case could lead to the classic hold-up problem.   
The premium that consumers are willing to pay for GM functional foods might 
not be sufficient for food manufacturers and lifescience firms to make an investment. The 
premium must be large enough to provide adequate rent to compensate for extra 
investment by food manufacturers and lifescience firms. The risk of a small percentage of 
the population becoming vocally opposed to the technology and driving away demand 
might be too large of a risk to take for the food manufacturers who receive only a portion 
of the benefit. 
 
1.2  Problem identification 
 
This thesis will examine the obstacles preventing the commercialization of GM 
functional foods. While there are many potential obstacles that could set back 
commercialization, this study deals with government policy uncertainty, consumer 
aversion and branding, and access to intellectual property. The thesis will provide a 
detailed description and theoretical model of how these factors create obstacles to 
                                                        
2 The promoter is the region of the DNA where RNA polymerase binds in order to initiate transcription. 
The selectable marker is a gene whose expression allows the identification of cells that have been 
transformed with the marker gene. The transformation method is a method of modifying the genome with 
DNA from a cell of a different genotype. Finally, the expressing protein is the protein produced from the 
previously mentioned coding sequences (Everythingbio.com, 2005) 
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commercialization. We will then explore how these obstacles will affect development of 
the future supply chain in a GM functional food industry. 
 
1.2.1  Government policy uncertainty 
When the first generation of GM crops were proceeding through the regulatory 
stages leading to commercial introduction in the mid 1990s, policymakers were 
concerned mainly with the safety of these products. It was not until later in that decade 
that widespread international consumer aversion to these products led to increased 
scrutiny over the way in which these products were approved. Many countries, including 
Canada, claim to base acceptance on the principle of substantial equivalence3. Other 
countries, most notably members of the EU, responded to consumer aversion by 
instituting a complete moratorium on new GM products in 1998 that lasted until 2004. 
This has recently been replaced by low tolerance levels for GM contamination and 
mandatory labelling requirements. 
Uncertainty within government policy can be a concern to those firms developing 
a new technology. Monsanto was recently affected by policy uncertainty. The lifescience 
multinational has delayed the development of glyphosate-tolerant wheat varieties in 
Canada, partially as a result of difficulty gaining approval from regulators. It was widely 
believed that this delay was in response to lobbying efforts by farm groups and 
agricultural organizations such as the Canadian Wheat Board who feared a large 
reduction in demand for Canadian wheat if glyphosate-tolerant varieties were approved. 
                                                        
3 The OECD (1993, pp.11) defines substantial equivalence as follows: knowledge that a new food or 
food component(s) was derived from organism(s) whose newly introduced traits have been well-
characterised, together with a conclusion that there has been reasonable certainty of no harm as compared 
with its conventional or traditional counterpart, means that a new food or food component(s)  can be 
considered substantially equivalent.  
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Although many farmers and consumers welcomed this decision by Monsanto, it provides 
a good example of the uncertainty that exists in the regulation of these products. As a 
result of this uncertainty, firms may be hesitant to invest funds in the development of new 
products that could meet resistance at the regulatory approval phase. 
GM functional foods could face a similar problem because of the process used to 
genetically alter conventional varieties to express extra health benefits. The issue is 
further complicated by the fact that if the food is altered to express altered nutritive 
content, it might no longer be viewed as substantially equivalent. Finally, in order for 
GM functional foods to communicate their value to the consumer, it will be important 
that certain claims are allowed. Current ambiguity in functional food regulation means 
that the types of claims that will be allowed on functional foods are not clear to 
manufacturers. Chapter two will explain the current status of these regulations, and 
explain the uncertainty that exists. With this uncertainty, investment into GM functional 
foods could be forestalled, which will be modelled in chapter three. 
 
1.2.2  The consumer aversion and brand risk problem 
Ultimately, the reaction of consumers to GM functional foods could be the most 
important factor in determining the success of these products. Consumer preference 
literature shows that there is a proportion of consumers that are willing to pay a premium 
for GM food if it provides them with some health benefits (Larue et al., 2004, Lusk et al., 
2003). There are several other factors that consumers take into consideration when 
purchasing food besides the nutritional content. Another important factor may be brand 
loyalty to specific manufacturer brands. 
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Food firms contemplating venturing into manufacturing GM functional foods will 
be interested in the consumers perception and willingness to pay. However, there are 
several other factors that will be examined before a food manufacturer invests in 
developing GM functional foods. Considering the high level of concentration within the 
food manufacturing sector, there is a strong possibility that a relatively large and diverse 
firm will be involved in production of these foods. These firms will want to consider the 
reaction of their consumers to the introduction of GM functional foods. In particular, 
these firms will be interested in how the introduction of a new GM functional food will 
affect the brand as a whole. If there is a negative reaction from the segment of the 
population that is strongly opposed to GM technology, it could negatively affect the 
brand value. Chapter 3 will model the possible outcomes of introducing a GM functional 
food. Depending on the size and influence of this group, backlash towards the brand as a 
whole could outweigh the benefits received from the consumers who purchase GM 
functional foods. 
 
1.2.3  Access to intellectual property 
The third factor that could set back the commercial introduction of the second 
generation of GM foods is the difficulty that firms developing functional foods have in 
obtaining the licenses necessary to gain access to intellectual property. As explained 
earlier, there are several components of the GM food that must be licensed in order to 
legally develop new products using the technology. Prior to commercial introduction of a 
new product, the firm must determine what pieces of technology within the product are 
patented and who holds the patent. After this information is known, the firm must 
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negotiate a license for the use of the technology. All of these processes carry transaction 
costs. 
The transaction cost economics literature that relates to the negotiation of licenses 
is reviewed in chapter two. Chapter two also explains some possible institutional 
solutions to the high transaction costs in the market for licenses to use intellectual 
property. Finally, the supply chain effects of access to intellectual property are reviewed. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical model of the effects of increased transaction costs on the 
supply chain for GM functional foods. 
 
1.3  Summary 
The introduction to this thesis presents the three factors that pose obstacles to the 
commercialization of GM functional foods. The three factors: government policy 
uncertainty, consumer aversion and brand risk, and access to intellectual property could 
cause a set back individually. The combination of these factors in the supply chain 
suggests the problem could be acute. Chapter two offers a background to the problem. 
Following the background, the literature detailing the three factors is discussed. Chapter 
three provides a theoretical framework to examine these problems separately. It also 
provides simulation analysis to show the effects on market shares of shocks to the 
modelled variables and parameters. Chapter four provides case studies using existing 
literature and interviews with those involved in the industry. These case studies are 
provided to identify examples of situations where the problems discussed are evident. 
The case studies identify past failures and successes that assist in identifying problems, 
and offer suggestions as to how to avoid the same problems in the future. Chapter five 
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provides a discussion linking the factors contributing to the delay of commercialization 
and offers predictions about the potential structure of the supply chain. Finally, chapter 
six provides a conclusion to the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
There are several issues in this thesis that must be explained in order to provide a 
background to the obstacles facing GM functional foods. First of all there is some 
confusion regarding the definitions of the terms that will be used throughout the thesis. 
Functional foods, nutraceuticals and natural health products are referred to often, but their 
distinct definitions are frequently confused. The first section of this chapter provides 
definitions of the terms. 
 Once the products are clearly defined, it becomes evident that a thesis focusing on 
functional foods, nutraceuticals and natural health products simultaneously would be 
quite a broad subject area to study. In order to draw more valuable conclusions, the 
remainder of the thesis will focus specifically on the obstacles delaying the 
commercialization of GM functional foods. 
 Following Section 2.2, the background to the problem is described in subsequent 
sections. The first factor considered is the regulations that exist in Canada, the US and the 
EU, along with the corresponding uncertainty. Specifically, the regulations concerning 
the types of claims that food manufacturers can insert on labels will be examined. 
Regulatory ambiguity, especially in Canada, could be a set back to commercial 
development of GM functional foods. Following this, the issues related to consumer 
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aversion and branding are discussed. Finally, another factor with the potential to impede 
commercial introduction of GM functional foods is the fact that the genetic commons that 
once existed internationally have been overtaken by patented genetic material. This 
means that in order for a firm to gain access to genetic material patented by another firm, 
they will probably have to negotiate licensing agreements. The process of obtaining the 
licenses required for commercialization could absorb much of the rents needed to justify 
the investment in the technology. The combination of the factors discussed in this chapter 
will provide a contextual background to explain why there has been no large-scale 
commercialization of functional foods. The purpose of the remainder of the thesis is to 
provide a deeper theoretical and empirical explanation of these issues. 
 
2.2  Functional foods, nutraceuticals, and natural health products 
The terms functional foods, nutraceuticals and natural health products are often 
blurred into one category. However, for the purposes of this thesis it will be necessary to 
provide a distinct definition of each product. Nutraceuticals and functional foods compete 
in different markets and target unique consumer characteristics, and are treated separately 
in this thesis. 
Health Canada have defined nutraceuticals as follows, 
A nutraceutical is a product produced from foods but sold in pills, 
powders, (potions) and other medicinal forms not generally associated 
with food and demonstrated to have a physiological benefit or provide 
protection against chronic disease. (Health Canada, 1997, pp. 6) 
 
The definition of a functional food, according to Health Canada is quite distinct 
from that of nutraceutical, 
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A functional food is similar in appearance to conventional foods, is 
consumed as part of a usual diet, and has demonstrated physiological 
benefits and/or reduces the risk of chronic disease beyond basic 
nutritional functions. (Health Canada, 1997, pp. 6) 
 
 
Natural Health Products are a combination of several types of products, including 
nutraceuticals, vitamins and minerals, herbal remedies, homeopathic medicines, 
traditional medicines such as traditional Chinese medicines, probiotics4, amino acids and 
essential fatty acids (NHPR, 2003). The term natural health product seems to be a label 
that is unique to Canadian regulations. The regulations for natural health products do not 
include food, so functional foods are excluded.  
At the retail level, nutraceuticals compete for market share with pharmaceuticals, 
supplements and vitamins. The claims made by nutraceuticals are more specific than 
those made on functional foods. The language used on the product labelling can be 
manipulated to distinguish between the two types of products. For example, a functional 
food would contain a label akin to Helps to maintain a healthy blood-pressure 
(Veeman, 2002). This type of label stresses that the functional food can help to maintain 
a healthy body; however, there are no measurable short-term results. A nutraceutical, on 
the other hand, would be similar to a pharmaceutical and use stronger language on the 
label such as, Reduces blood pressure (Veeman, 2002). The types of claims that are 
currently allowable in Canada are shown in sub-section 2.3.1, while an example of 
wording is shown in sub-section 2.3.2. 
 
                                                        
4 A probiotic is defined in the Canadian Natural Health Products Regulations as, a monoculture or 
mixed-culture of live micro-organisms that benefit the microbiota indigenous to humans. (NHPR, 2003, 
pp. 1537). 
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2.2.1  Functional foods 
Many of the foods that are consumed throughout the world provide the individual 
consuming the food with a type of function. There is some disagreement about using 
the term functional foods, because all food serves some function (Health Canada, 1997). 
There are several traditional foods that contain functional properties.  
Most functional foods contain phytochemicals. Phytochemicals are non-nutrient, 
physiologically active plant components which are present in plant materials in relatively 
small amounts compared to macronutrients (Unnevehr and Hasler, 2000). Lycopene is a 
well-known example of a phytochemical that is available by consuming tomatoes. 
Lycopene consumption has been shown to lower the risk of cancers such as prostate, 
breast, digestive tract, skin and lung (Hasler, 1998).  
There are several other examples of functional foods. Cruciferous vegetables such 
as broccoli and brussels sprouts contain glucosinolates, a metabolite, which are 
synthesised from amino acids and may reduce the risk of cancer (Wang et al., 2002). 
Other potential cancer-fighting foods include citrus fruits, which contain a group of 
phytochemicals called limonoids; and beef, which contains omega-3 fatty acid and 
linoleic acid (SCC, 2004). The risk of cardiovascular disease can also be reduced through 
consumption of certain foods which many people include as a regular portion of their 
diet. Soy can reduce cholesterol, while tea and wine can also reduce the risk of 
cardiovascular disease. Cranberries are well known for fighting urinary tract infections, 
while garlic is considered to be the most widely known herbal remedy (Hasler, 1998). 
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A list of functional foods is shown in Table 1. This table shows examples of 
conventional foods and the phytochemicals, antioxidants and omega-3 fatty acids that 
they contain. It also shows the potential health benefits that can be obtained by 
consuming these foods regularly in the diet. 
The second generation of biotechnology promises to enhance these characteristics 
in existing foods. For example, the levels of phytochemicals in broccoli and tomatoes can 
fluctuate substantially. Biotechnology could be used to make the availability of the 
phytochemicals more consistent. Scientists at Purdue University, in cooperation with the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), have developed a tomato variety with 
three times the concentration of lycopene as a conventional variety (BIO, 2004). Another 
target of the next generation of biotechnology will be to remove the allergens from foods, 
which commonly cause allergic reactions. Examples are peanuts, soybeans, and wheat. 
The most well-known example of a potential functional food developed from 
biotechnology is beta-carotene enhanced rice, commonly referred to as Golden Rice. 
Golden Rice has been developed to target nutritional deficiencies in the developing 
world. Development of Golden Rice has been accomplished through the addition of a 
daffodil gene so that the rice contains beta-carotene (Lusk, 2003). Regions of the world 
where rice makes up a large proportion of the diet also have a high level of Vitamin A 
deficiency. Vitamin A is critical in the health of the eyes and the immune system (Dawe 
et. al, 2002). However, Golden Rice has not yet become commercially available.  
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Table 2.1. Foods, Functional Properties, and Health Benefits 
Source: SCC, 2004 
Currently, functional foods are regulated in Canada as regular foods; although 
future generations of functional foods could have to undergo more intense regulatory 
scrutiny because of the increased significance of health claims that they could be making. 
Due to the current regulations, most of the safety assessment is completed through 
premarket monitoring. The principle of substantial equivalence has been used in Canada 
and the US to determine food and environmental safety with the products of 
biotechnology and other novel foods. With the new or increased concentration of 
phytochemicals in functional foods, the specific differences relative to the closest 
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conventional comparison would be subject to more intense study (TFILSI, 2004). The 
regulatory contingencies are further clarified in Section 2.2. 
Many consumers have called for postmarket monitoring of GM foods. Postmarket 
monitoring would specifically follow consumption of the foods and watch for adverse 
health reactions from consumers that can be directly associated with specific 
characteristics in foods. An example of a product that has been exposed to postmarket 
monitoring is the artificial sweetener aspartame. In Canada the studies were performed by 
the Canadian Health Protection Branch (a division of Health Canada), while in the US the 
studies were performed by the Food and Drug Administration. The postmarket studies 
were performed on different segments of the population (i.e. healthy adults, children, 
lactating females and diabetics) in order to determine their actual consumption rates and 
the resulting health effects. This was done because regulators felt they could not 
accurately determine these factors in premarket testing (Butchko et al., 1994). This type 
of evaluation is also currently used in drugs and medical devices because all situations 
and reactions cannot be accounted for in premarket testing.  
Although the first generation of GM foods have not yet warranted this type of 
evaluation, the second generation might be forced to complete some postmarket 
monitoring. The reason is not the fact that the product is GM, but rather that the 
consumption patterns of these foods will be difficult to estimate in the premarket study. 
The concern will be the interaction between phytochemicals at increased concentrations 
in an unknown consumption pattern. This different level of regulation might be forced on 
the industry, and could be an extra cost that delays the commercial introduction of foods 
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with new functional characteristics that target specific health problems. However, this is 
also the type of functional food that will provide the most benefit to the consumer. 
 
2.3  Regulations of nutraceuticals, functional foods and natural health products 
The regulation of functional foods can be confusing to industry members, 
particularly the regulatory differences between countries that complicate international 
trade. A nutraceutical would fall under the regulations for natural health products in 
Canada, which are more intensive and well-defined. The majority of the following 
section on regulations focuses on Canada, but the regulatory situations in the US and the 
EU is also discussed briefly. 
 
2.3.1  Natural health product and functional food regulation in Canada 
 The Canada Food and Drug Act was passed in 1953. The Act distinguishes 
between food and drugs. The distinctions have remained the same since the introduction 
of the Act. This means that there is currently no provision for a food product to make a 
claim relating to usage or possible health benefits of the product (Fitzpatrick, 2004a). 
 On January 1 2004, the regulations for natural health products came into effect. 
The definition of a natural health product is divided into two parts; these include the 
function and substance. The function of a natural health product is any product that is 
manufactured, sold or represented for use in: 
• diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or 
abnormal physical state or its symptoms in humans; 
• restoring or correcting organic functions in humans; or 
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• modifying organic functions in humans, such as modifying those functions 
in a manner that maintains or promotes health (NHPD, 2003). 
The definition of a drug is given in Section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act. A drug 
is defined as any substance or mixture of substances represented, sold or manufactured 
for use in: 
• diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or 
abnormal physical state or its symptoms in humans or animals; 
• restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions in humans or animals; 
or 
• disinfection in premises where food is manufactured, prepared or kept 
(Food and Drug Act, 2004). 
It is interesting to note the similarity between the two definitions; the only 
difference is the inclusion of animals and disinfection in the definition of drug. However, 
in the substance portion of the definition for natural health products they are 
differentiated from a drug. The substance portion of the definition is divided into 
acceptable and non-acceptable substances. They are listed as follows: 
Acceptable Substances: 
(a) a plant or plant material, alga, fungus or non-human animal material, 
(b) an extract or isolate of the items listed in (a), the primary molecular 
structure of which is the same as that which it had prior to its 
extraction or isolation, 
(c) a vitamin or any of its salts or derivatives, 
(d) an amino acid or any of its salts, 
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(e) an essential fatty acid, 
(f) a synthetic duplicate of (b) through (e), 
(g) a mineral; and  
(h) a probiotic (NHPD, 2003, pp. 5-8) 
Non-Acceptable Substances: 
(a) a substance set out in Schedule C of the Food and Drugs Act 
i) these include radiopharmaceuticals and other drugs for use in the 
preparation of radiopharmaceuticals 
(b) a substance set out in Schedule D of the Food and Drugs Act5, except 
for 
i) a drug prepared from micro-organisms such as an alga, a bacterium 
or a fungus, and 
ii) any substance in Schedule D that is prepared in accordance with 
the practices of homeopathic pharmacy 
(c) a substance regulated under the Tobacco Act 
(d) a substance set out in Sections I through V of the Controlled Drug and 
Substances Act6, and only the following products listed in Section VI 
are permissible as natural health products: 
i) Benzyl methyl ketone 
ii) Ephedrine 
iii) Ergometrine 
                                                        
5 For a full listing of the substances listed in Schedule D refer to the Food and Drugs Act online at 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/f-27/61279.html  
6 For a full listing of the substances listed in Schedules I to VI of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
refer to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act online at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-38.8/text.html 
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iv) Ergotamine 
v) Lysergic acid 
vi) Pseudoephedrine 
(e) a substance that is administered by puncturing the dermis 
(f) an antibiotic prepared from an alga, bacterium or a fungus, or a 
synthetic duplicate of that antibiotic (NHPD, 2003, pp. 9-10). 
The definition of natural health product does not include food anywhere. It will 
encompass nutraceuticals as defined earlier, but also vitamins and other natural 
substances in extract form. To date, there have been no instituted regulations for health 
claims in foods in Canada. Health Canada has put forth a proposed framework for 
product specific authorization for health claims in foods, but this has not passed the 
proposal stage (Health Canada, 2001). However, the proposal does lay out the potential 
applications of the proposed regulations as follows: 
• all food and beverages, with or without modification or fortification, that are: 
o in a form readily recognizable to consumers as being food products, 
o consumed to provide nourishment, nutrition or hydration, or satisfy 
hunger, thirst or a desire for taste, texture or flavour under customary 
conditions of use or according to instructions, and 
o manufactured, sold or represented to have a direct measurable effect on 
! modifying, restoring or correcting an organic function or body 
structure of human beings, beyond normal growth and 
development or maintenance of good health, or 
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! reducing the risk of or facilitating the dietary management of 
diseases or health-related conditions. 
• a food or beverage that meets the criteria described above would also be 
subject to food regulations under the Food and Drugs Act and Parts A,B and 
D (Divisions 1, 2 and 3) of the Food and Drug Regulations 
• foods meeting the criteria described under the first bullet would be required to 
carry a Claim Identification Number 
•  foods meeting the criteria under Division 2 (alcoholic beverages), Division 5 
(coffee) or Division 20 (tea) of Part B of the Food and Drug Regulations 
would not be subject to the proposed regulations unless they are sold or 
represented to have effects described under the first bullet, and 
• Parts C and D (Divisions 4 and 5) of the Food and Drugs Regulations and 
requirements governing natural health products would not apply to a food 
meeting the requirements under the first bullet (Health Canada, 2001, P.6). 
Further to the applications of the proposed regulatory framework listed 
previously, there are conditions underlying the allowable claims that can be made for a 
food. In general, the food manufacturer or importer must make an application for a Claim 
Identification Number. In this application, the applicant must include contact information 
(name, address and telephone number), product information (ingredients, nutrient 
composition, processing and intended use and target users), and the proposed claim and 
required information to support it (assessment of product safety, claim validity and 
quality assurance). The claim validity would be measured through the inclusion of 
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documentation and studies to support the claim that falls within the appropriate ethical 
standards and guidelines (Health Canada, 2001). 
  At the present time in Canada these regulations are not in effect. Functional food 
manufacturers have had to follow limited allowable claims when labelling functional 
foods. At the present time there are five allowable generic diet based claims linking a 
food/nutrient to a reduction in the risk of contracting a disease or condition. An example 
of the wording of the claims is shown in sub-section 2.3.2. The allowable linkages are as 
follows: 
• Sodium and Hypertension 
• Calcium and Osteoporosis 
• Saturated and Trans fat, and Cholesterol and Coronary Heart Disease 
• Fruits and Vegetables, and Cancer 
• Sugar Alcohols and Tooth Decay (Fitzpatrick, 2004a) 
In addition, Canadian authorities are considering the addition of five links, which 
the US has already approved, between certain food/nutrient consumption and the 
reduction in risk of contracting a disease or condition. These are as follows: 
• Folate and neural tube defects 
• Fibre-containing grain products, fruits, vegetables and cancers 
• Fruits, vegetables and grain products that contain fibre, particularly soluble 
fibre and risk of coronary heart disease 
• Soluble fibre and risk of coronary heart disease (Fitzpatrick, 2004a). 
The type of claim that is allowed will be discussed in the section on US 
regulations below. It should be noted that the lack of concrete regulations for functional 
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foods in Canada is a concern for industry participants. Fitzpatrick (2004a) states that the 
ambiguity with respect to functional foods in Canada is the main driver behind the lack of 
introduction of new products.  
 
2.3.2  Functional food regulations in the United States 
Since Canada seems to be following the US in the development of functional food 
regulations, it is useful to look at the regulatory situation in that country. The US is also a 
major market for Canadian food exports, so successful introduction of GM functional 
foods will likely depend on regulatory factors in the US. In the US, health claims on 
foods that contain omega-3 fatty acids have recently been approved. The type of claim is 
similar to those listed previously. The claims that are allowed on these types of foods are 
as follows: 
Supportive but not conclusive research shows that consumption of EPA and DHA 
omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease. One serving of [name 
of food] provides [x] grams of EPA and DHA omega-3 fatty acids. [See nutrition 
information for total fat, saturated fat and cholesterol]. (FDA, 2004, pp.1). 
 The FDA authorities in the US have been concerned with the estimated 500,000 
deaths annually within the US that have been attributed to coronary heart disease (FDA, 
2004). They hope that by allowing this type of general claim on products containing 
omega-3 fatty acids, consumers might include more of these foods in their diets and the 
incidence of coronary heart disease could eventually be reduced. 
The regulations in the US state that in order for a claim to be considered, it must 
be made in regards to a disease or condition that the US population or a sub-group of the 
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population (i.e. the elderly) is at risk to contract. In order to verify that the claim is valid, 
the regulatory authorities will consider the range of publicly available scientific research 
based on sound experimental design and for which there is significant agreement among 
the scientific experts in that area (CFR, 2002). 
 
2.3.3  Functional food regulations in the European Union  
Another large market for agricultural goods, and one of particular interest because 
of strict restrictions on GM foods, is the EU. In the EU, health claims must be confirmed 
through scientific evidence. Where there are health claims included on the label of a food 
product, the label must also contain some other information. First, the label must contain 
a statement emphasising the importance of a balanced diet and a healthy lifestyle. If the 
claim is made referencing disease prevention, a disclaimer must also be made that 
diseases can have several risk factors, and altering a single factor might have no bearing 
on reducing the risk of contracting the disease. Second, the quantity of the food that must 
be consumed to obtain the desired effect must be included on the label. Third, a statement 
is required listing the type of individuals that should avoid consumption of the product; 
and fourth, a warning of a quantity (if any) of consumption of the product to avoid 
because of a risk to health is required (COEC, 2003) 
There are also several claims that are not allowed under the EU regulations. There 
can be no general claims made, such as claims for overall good health or well-being. 
Claims pertaining to psychological or behavioural characteristics are also not allowed. 
Weight control and weight loss claims cannot be made on these products. Finally, those 
claims that make reference to doctor-recommendations, along with claims that state that 
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an individuals health could be adversely affected if the food was not consumed are not 
permissible (COEC, 2001). 
To simplify the process, the EU has a list of nutritional and health claims that can 
be made. There is also a list of rejected claims that cannot be made. Some claims might 
also be restricted, meaning that they cannot be used without first going through the 
proper authorisation process (COEC, 2001). Through this registry, firms involved in 
researching new foods have a clear guideline to the requirements they must meet in order 
to make claims. Also, these firms can find out what degree of testing and authorisation 
they must have to make the claims. 
From the overview of the regulations in Canada, the US and the EU it is evident 
that although Canada is moving to more well-defined regulations for natural health 
products, it is falling behind in regulations for functional foods. It is important that 
governments regulate, not only to provide guidance to innovators, but also to provide 
standards that help to protect the safety of consumers. Without proper regulation with 
respect to claims, there is the potential for the problem of information asymmetry because 
consumers might not know what health benefits or concerns arise from consuming certain 
foods.  
The focus of this project is to examine the set back to the introduction of GM 
functional foods. One possible explanation is the regulatory uncertainty that exists in 
Canada with respect to these products. The next section examines the literature with 
respect to consumers, biotechnology and functional foods. It also examines the food 
manufacturers decision to expand their brand, which may have more influence on the 
potential set back to commercialization than individual consumer aversion. 
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2.4  Consumers and biotechnology 
Since the introduction of GM crops in 1996, farmers in Canada and the US have 
rapidly adopted the technology. In response to the rapid introduction of GM crops into 
the food chain, some consumers have voiced their opposition to the farming and 
production of GM foods (Klein et al., 1998). This has been especially prevalent in the 
EU, where lobby groups have a strong voice. Much of the aversion to GM foods has been 
emphasised by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which include this opposition 
with a wider focus on reducing globalisation and free trade (Klein et al., 1998). Hobbs 
and Plunkett (1999) stated that a key driver for these concerns is that consumers have a 
lack of accurate knowledge about, and a lack of confidence in, the science and regulation 
of GM foods. A history of food-related problems such as Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy has reduced the public trust of Europeans towards food manufacturers 
and regulators. Finally, to this point, the benefits of GM crops have for the most part been 
enjoyed by the developers and farmers (agronomic benefits). Consumers have not 
received a direct benefit in return for what some perceive as an increased risk. Regardless 
of whether there are any true long term health effects from consuming the products of 
biotechnology, the high level of consumer aversion creates concern for regulators, 
lifescience firms and food manufacturers. This section reviews literature regarding 
consumer concerns and the factors affecting willingness-to-pay to avoid existing GM 
foods, or to consume hypothetical GM foods with functional output traits. 
Some consumers have ethical concerns regarding the GM technology (Hobbs and 
Plunkett, 1999). These consumers are not concerned with the food or environmental 
 28
 
safety of the GM food; rather they are concerned that the processes used to create the 
technology are unethical. This group of consumers create a concern for the developers of 
GM functional foods because further proof of safety and efficacy of the functional foods 
will have little effect on their purchase decision. This is because this portion of the 
population is more concerned with the process in which the good is produced, not the 
benefits received from the end product (Frewer et al., 1997). The only way these 
consumers are going to change their opinion is to learn some new information that 
changes their ethical opposition.  
Studies on the welfare effects of GMOs have concluded that if the benefit of the 
first generation of GM crops is not passed on to the consumer through a price low enough 
to compensate for the aversion to the technology, there may be net welfare loss to society 
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Plunkett and Gaisford, 2000). However, for the second 
generation of functional foods, some consumers could receive an additional health benefit 
from the technology. This could possibly outweigh the negative effects on utility from 
aversion to the GM component of the technology.  
In many cases, the consumer aversion to GM foods could be overestimated by 
consumer studies. In an International Food Information Council survey using American 
consumers in 2003, respondents were given an open-ended question regarding whether 
they would like additional information on food labels. The results showed that 77% of 
respondents could not identify any additional label information that was not currently 
present. Respondents who did identify additional information mostly wanted increased 
nutritional information (9%). In this survey, only 2% of American consumers listed 
labelling of GM foods as a priority (IFIC, 2003).  
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There has been increasing demand for organic foods, which are non-GM by 
definition (AMS, 2005). In Canada, organic consumption has been growing at 20-25% 
annually, with retail sales of $0.75 to US $1 billion in 2003 (Kortbech-Olesen, 2004).  
The US is the worlds largest market for organic food with sales estimated at US $8 
billion in 2000 (Kortbech-Olesen, 2002), with growth expected at a rate of 20% annually 
(Greene et al., 2001).  The EU market was US $4.5 billion in 1998 (Wier and Calverley, 
2002). However, in all cases, the consumption of organic foods still only comprises 1-2% 
of total food purchases (Kortbech-Olesen, 2002).  
A potential reason for less dramatic growth in consumption of non-GM food in 
North America compared to Europe is that North American consumers might not realize 
the prevalence of GM crops in the foods they eat. One would expect that even if a small 
percentage of consumers who claim to be concerned about GM foods purchased organics, 
the market share of organic foods would be larger. A possible explanation is that 
consumers do not express their concern in the retail market as strongly as it is captured in 
consumer studies (Smyth and Phillips, 2003). Another explanation is that consumption of 
organic foods can only increase at the same rate as supply. In the US, the consumption 
and supply of organic foods seem to be increasing at the same rate (Greene et al., 2001). 
However, the link between concern for GM foods and an increase in non-GM and 
organic food has not been proven. There are several explanations for the increase in 
demand for organic food including environmental concerns, desire that food be chemical-
free, perceived enhanced animal welfare and apprehension about GM technology (Greene 
et al., 2003).  
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There have been numerous attitudinal surveys performed on potential consumers 
to determine their attitudes towards GM foods. Hypothetical stated preference studies can 
overestimate the aversion that consumers have to GM foods. Marks et al. (2003) state that 
although hypothetical consumer preference studies by Hallman (1996) showed that 
consumers in the US had a strong aversion to GM milk, the percentage of consumers 
purchasing rBST-free milk is very small.  
Even more surprising is a separate revealed preference study on Dutch consumers 
at the retail level. Marks et al. (2004) initially predicted that given strong opposition to 
the introduction of GM foods into the European market it would follow that given a 
choice, most Europeans would consume non-GM foods. The data set was collected from 
April 13 1997 until December 30 2001. GM labels were added on June 22 1997 and 
removed May 14 2000. The empirical work was completed using an AIDS model. The 
goods either contained GM ingredients and carried a GM label, or contained no GM 
ingredients and carried no label. The products were positioned beside each other on the 
retail shelves. The effects of own price, substitutes prices, per capita real expenditure for 
the product category, holiday effects and the addition and removal of GM labels were 
accounted for in a non-linear conditional expenditure model. Also, the effects of media 
coverage were included (Marks et al., 2004). Using canned soup, frozen processed meat, 
frozen pizza and frozen processed fish to follow consumption patterns it was concluded 
that adding a contains GM ingredients positive label did not significantly alter the 
purchasing behaviour (Marks et al., 2004).  
The interesting question then becomes whether consumers are willing to pay for 
functional characteristics in foods that are attained through biotechnology. Lusk (2003) 
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uses contingent valuation to determine the willingness to pay for Golden rice among 
respondents in the US state of Mississippi through a mail survey sent out in July 2001. A 
concern that exists with contingent valuation is the hypothetical bias that could cause 
respondents to overstate the amount that they are willing to pay. Lusk (2003) tries to limit 
the hypothetical bias by using a technique referred to as cheap talk7. Cheap talk is 
additional information that is provided to the consumer to make them better informed in 
order to limit the hypothetical bias. It was found that consumers not given cheap talk 
exhibited more inelastic demand than those who received it (Lusk, 2003). Those given 
cheap talk were willing to pay US $0.13 less than those who did not receive it. 
However, cheap talk did not completely eliminate the hypothetical bias. If the price of 
conventional white rice was US $0.70 per pound, those not given cheap talk were 
willing to pay US $1.00 per pound for Golden Rice, while those who received cheap talk 
were willing to pay US $0.87 per pound (Lusk, 2003). This wide range of responses 
would be a concern to someone attempting to perform profitability estimates (Lusk, 
2003). 
There are several factors that consumers take into consideration when making the 
decision to purchase, in addition to whether the food contains GM ingredients. Lusk et al. 
(2002) used a form of conjoint analysis called a choice experiment to determine 
consumer willingness to pay for corn chips. The sample was composed of students 
enrolled in an agricultural economics course at Kansas State University. The students 
were given a series of questions where they gave demographic information and were 
                                                        
7 Lusk (2003) performs cheap talk by employing a cheap talk script. The cheap talk script explains the 
fact that in past surveys similar to the one the respondent is about to complete, the respondents showed 
hypothetical bias. It stated, 80% of people said they would buy the new food. However, when a grocery 
store actually put the same new food on their shelf, but where payment was real and people really did have 
to pay money if they decided to purchase the new food, the results were that only 43% of people actually 
bought the new food. (Lusk, 2003, pp.856)  
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surveyed regarding their preferences regarding GM foods. The main experimental 
procedure followed the survey. Both first and second-price auction formats were used to 
randomly determine bids on different bundles of characteristics. This method gives 
respondents a choice of bundles of goods with different attributes, in a number of 
combinations in order to generate a willingness to pay for certain attributes. In this study, 
consumers chose between brands (Tostitos and No Brand), stores (Kroger and Jitney 
Jungle), price ($4.00, $3.00 and $2.00), and type of corn used (GM corn to increase yield, 
GM corn to increase shelf life and non-GM corn).  
The analysis showed that the brand had a much larger effect on willingness to pay 
than all other factors combined. Consumers were willing to pay US $1.70 more for a bag 
of Tostitos than No Brand. The willingness to pay for corn chips purchased at Kroger was 
US $0.65 more than those purchased at Jitney Jungle. Consumers were willing to pay US 
$0.33 more for GM corn chips with increased shelf life compared to GM corn chips that 
gave higher yield. However, when compared to non-GM corn chips, consumers were 
only willing to pay US $0.01 premium for GM corn chips that increased shelf life. Lusk 
et al. (2002) conclude that brand image and store loyalty has a much larger impact on 
consumer choice than the type of corn used to produce the chips.    
Larue et al. (2004) specifically attempted to identify the willingness to pay for 
GM functional foods. In April 2001, a telephone survey was performed by SOM Inc. to 
gather data from a representative sample of 1008 Canadian respondents. In a stated-
choice experiment, respondents chose from descriptions of hypothetical foods produced 
through conventional, organic and GM methods. The available products were tomato 
sauce, potato chips and chicken breasts. The tomato sauce had a functional property of 
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anti-cancer, while chicken breasts and potato chips had a heart-healthy functional 
property. A random parameters logit model was used to generate the results from the 
survey. The results showed that the utility of the respondents increased from potato chips 
that contained the heart healthy label, regardless of whether the potato chips were 
produced through conventional or GM methods. The mean coefficients for chicken 
breasts and tomato sauce with functional properties created through GM techniques were 
not significantly different from zero, while the corresponding standard deviation 
coefficients are significant (Larue et al., 2004). They stated that this implies that for about 
half of the consumers the utility from the functional property induced through GM was 
larger than that through conventional means, and for the other half of consumers it was 
smaller. Larue et al. (2004) then estimated the willingness to pay for the functional 
properties for conventional and organic functional foods. None of the GM goods have 
statistically significant results.  
The value of the functional property in chicken breasts was CDN $1.88/kg for 
conventional and CDN $8.25/kg in organic, while it is only CDN $0.73/kg for GM. For 
potato chips, the value of the functional properties are CDN $0.64/150 gram bag of 
conventional, CDN $1.16/150 gram bag of organic and CDN $0.85/150 gram bag of GM. 
Tomato sauce with functional properties had estimated premiums of CDN $0.64/398 ml 
can for conventional, CDN $0.50/398 ml can of organic and CDN $0.73/398 ml can of 
GM.8 It is interesting in this case that the GM tomato sauce commands the highest 
premium, especially since it has the lowest average price. However, the high standard 
deviations in both the conventional and GM estimates means that the two premiums are 
                                                        
8 These premiums were calculated relative to average prices. The average prices for organic were estimated 
at approximately twice that of conventional, while the average prices for GM were estimated somewhat  
below the conventional price. 
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not statistically different. This was a surprising result that consumers might pay the same 
premium for functional health properties in GM and conventional foods. However, the 
remainder of the results led Larue et al. (2004) to conclude that the majority of consumers 
prefer conventionally produced goods over organic or GM, even though there were 
smaller groups of consumers with preferences for organic and GM produced foods. The 
final conclusion is that the introduction of functional traits in GM foods might make them 
more popular, as long as similar traits are not available in conventional or organic foods.   
Consumer preference and willingness-to-pay studies give an indication of the 
general views of consumers towards biotechnology, and the potential values they place 
on functional characteristics. However, it must be understood that there are limitations to 
the accuracy of these studies. Consumers do not hold a static set of preferences towards 
food. Media coverage and scientific studies can influence individuals preferences. The 
research and development process involved in producing GM functional foods can be 
expected to take more than 10 years. Innovators within the industry likely need to base 
decision-making on more than hypothetical studies based on individuals preferences that 
could change (Stark, 2005).   
 Consumers aversion to GM foods is definitely important to food manufacturers 
who are considering which ingredients to use in their products. The introduction of GM 
functional foods will create an additional issue for food manufacturers. The effect of the 
brand image of a firm may be an important factor for a food manufacturer in deciding 
whether to introduce a GM functional food to its product line. The following subsection 
reviews literature with respect to branding. 
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2.4.1  Consumers and branding 
Consumer preferences for a specific product are not the only factor that a firm is 
likely to take into consideration when making the decision to add a new product. Many 
firms in the food processing industry produce a line of diverse products. The decision to 
expand the brand to include a GM functional food is more complex than simply 
determining whether there is a group of consumers willing to pay a premium for the 
product. Even if the product itself finds a niche and is profitable, there might be backlash 
against the whole brand by consumers who have strong preferences regarding GM foods. 
The following section deals with the firms decision to expand their brand. 
The decision to stretch a firms brand to new products can have broad effects on 
the firm as a whole. Cabral (2000) discusses three effects of stretching a brand. The first 
is the direct reputation effect, whereby the firms reputation influences the willingness to 
pay for a new product. The feedback reputation effect is the change in the willingness to 
pay for the original product as a result of the performance of the new product. Thirdly, 
the signalling effect is a signal of overall firm quality that represents the overall effect of 
stretching the brand on both old and new products. Overall, Cabral (2000) makes several 
propositions according to the effects explained above. For any given reputation, the firm 
with the highest quality is most likely to expand. For any given quality level, the firm 
with the highest reputation is most likely to expand. If the new product provides a high 
level of profit compared to the base product, firms with a sufficiently high reputation will 
stretch their brand to take advantage of their reputation. Finally, if the new product is 
relatively unimportant in terms of profitability, firms with a low reputation expand in an 
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attempt to boost their brand. On a similar product, a firm with a high reputation is 
unlikely to expand because of the desire to protect their image. 
Empirically, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) showed that in automobiles and drugs, 
the cost of bad news on one product can have a negative impact on the firm as a whole. 
The study divided the cost of drug and automobile recalls into direct and capital market 
costs. The direct costs were the actual costs involved in recalling the products, combined 
with the costs incurred to try to gain back consumer confidence. The capital market costs 
were the losses to the firms in terms of share value resulting from the recall. The study 
period ran from 1974 to 1982 for drug recalls and 1967 to 1981 for automobile recalls. 
The effect of a one dollar increase in the direct cost of a drug recall was an increase of 
two to four dollars in the shareholders loss for that firm.  The study was unable to draw 
an equivalent link in the automobile case because individual recall costs were not 
recorded. It was concluded that in both cases the wealth of the shareholders was more 
negatively affected than the direct cost to the firm. This resulted from a general loss to 
the goodwill value of the firm. Also interesting was the conclusion that in both cases, the 
shareholder value of the firms competitors also declines. Any potential benefit from the 
increased demand for substitutes is outweighed by negative perceptions of the industry in 
general (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985).  
In the context of GM functional foods, a product with tangible and valuable health 
benefits would be similar to high quality. Given that the GM functional food had a high 
quality, the strongest brand would be most likely to expand. If the benefits from the GM 
functional food were less tangible, it could be considered unimportant. A firm with a 
low reputation would be more likely to expand their brand in this case.  
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If one assumes that, at least for the initial GM functional foods, the health benefits 
will be relatively small, firms with lower reputation could be responsible for their 
commercialization. In food markets, one could divide the market into national brands (i.e. 
Kraft, Heinz), private labels (i.e. Safeway Select, Our Compliments  Sobeys) and 
discount private labels (i.e. Smart Choice  Sobeys, No Name  Real Canadian 
Superstore). Of these choices, the private labels are growing in popularity. In the United 
Kingdom, 62% of new product launches come from own-brands (Henson and Northen, 
1998). It is difficult to make a hypothesis regarding who could expand their brand to 
include GM functional foods. The concentration of food manufacturers and retailers 
means that most firms involved have a reputation to protect. National brands generally 
have a large and diverse product offering. Private labels, while sometimes selling at a 
discount, do not necessarily carry a lower reputation. The expansion of a private label can 
effect the reputation of the store (i.e. Safeway, Sobeys) as a whole.  
Potential consumer aversion to GM foods is a major concern to those firms 
putting resources into developing functional foods from biotechnology. Not only is this a 
concern to the lifescience firms developing the primary crops, but also to the food 
manufacturers. This could be an important component of the set back to 
commercialization of GM functional foods. Perhaps food manufacturers and lifescience 
firms are waiting for the vocal opposition from consumer groups and NGOs to recede 
before investing substantial resources into product development.  
Food manufacturers, especially those with valuable brand identities, are reluctant 
to introduce new food products that have the potential to be controversial (Fitzpatrick, 
2004b). Any new food safety or consumer satisfaction problem could negatively affect 
 38
 
the entire brand image. If this is combined with the criteria under which a firm decides to 
expand its brand discussed by Cabral (2000), there might be only a small number of firms 
interested in investing in GM functional foods. In combination with the problems 
described in the following sections, there is convincing reason to predict that several 
issues are causing a delay in the commercialization of GM functional foods.  
The problem of consumer aversion, and the issues that accompany it, become 
even more important when the extra costs required to gain access to patented intellectual 
property are considered. The relative complexity of the intellectual property involved in 
the creation of GM functional food creates additional costs for the seed developer, which 
will have to be recovered through the supply chain, possibly in part through a higher 
consumer price. The following section outlines the issues created through the 
requirements firms have to gain access to intellectual property.  
 
2.5  Access to intellectual property  
The second generation of GM foods will face a unique problem that has until 
recently, not been a major concern to the food industry. Since the landmark case in the 
US of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 1980, biotechnology, seed and agrochemical firms 
have started intensive research efforts (Graff et al., 2003). The case resulted from a patent 
application filed by Chakrabarty in 1972 for genetically engineered bacteria that was to 
be used in cleaning up oil spills. Chakrabarty was employed by General Electric 
Company at the time. Chakrabarty made three types of patent claims: the first was a 
method to produce the bacteria, the second was a carrier for the bacteria (i.e. straw), and 
the third was the bacteria itself (FLLP, 1980). Initially, the first two were accepted by the 
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US patent office, but the third was rejected with the reason being that micro-organisms 
are products of nature. This decision was appealed and overturned with the ruling stating 
that the fact that the micro-organisms were living did not have legal significance (FLLP, 
1980). Once a firm or individual receives the patent rights to a product/process such as in 
the Chakrabarty case, it follows that the innovator has sole access to the returns from 
their innovation (Smith, 2002).  
A patent holder can share its sole access to a product through negotiating licenses 
with other firms and individuals. Licensing has drawbacks, because of transaction costs, 
including information and negotiation costs. Williamson (1986) posits that costs that 
occur in commercial activity are the economic equivalent of friction in physics; if they 
are denied consideration, the results become inaccurate. Information and negotiation 
costs are two of three classifications of transaction costs, the third being monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Information costs occur ex ante to the transaction and include all costs 
of identifying the negotiating partner and gaining price and product information (Hobbs, 
1997). The process of gaining access to the intellectual property necessary to develop 
GM functional foods could be a major cost. All the processes could potentially be 
patented by different firms. The interested firm must identify what has been patented, and 
by whom, before any negotiation occurs. This can prove to be the most difficult process 
(Devine, 2004). Following the information gathering stage, the firms must negotiate a 
license for use of the patented product or process. Negotiation costs include the costs of 
actually performing the transaction. Included are the commission costs, the costs of 
negotiating the terms of the contract and actually preparing the contract (Hobbs, 1997). 
Often it is understood by both parties that, due to the length of the negotiation period to 
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gain patent licenses, research will continue during this period. This ongoing research time 
is included in the license agreement (Devine, 2004).  
In several cases in the lifescience industries, firms have avoided these costs 
through mergers and acquisitions. Hubbard (1997) explains this behaviour as an outcome 
of inadequate institutions, such that the industry will exhibit low barriers to entry 
accompanied with a high barrier to growth. In the case of intellectual property, the lack of 
a structured market to facilitate the exchange of licenses could be considered an 
inadequate institution. Although patents are recorded in national databases world-wide, 
the process of searching for whether a piece of technology is the intellectual property of 
another individual/firm takes time and resources. This potential inadequate institution 
could be considered a possible explanation for the present structure of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry.9  
An explanation of the current industrial structure of the lifescience industry is 
given by Fulton and Giannakas (2001). The paper lists sunk costs of intellectual property 
and research and development, combined with the sunk costs of gaining regulatory 
approval as the first reason for increased concentration in the lifescience industry. The 
second reason is the escalation strategy, consisting of mergers and acquisitions by firms 
in the industry in an attempt to gain a dominant position. The changes in vertical structure 
of the lifescience industry are explained in two ways. First, some products have been 
designed so that they are complements to certain pesticides. In these cases it is most 
                                                        
9 It could be argued that there are high barriers to entry in the agricultural biotechnology industry, but there 
have been examples of relatively small companies which have developed significant intellectual property. 
The former agricultural biotechnology firm Calgene started small but developed the genetic technology to 
delay ripening in tomatoes (Flavr Savr), resistance to the herbicide bromoxynil in cotton and industrial oils 
in canola. Calgene showed promise, but could not succeed under the economic pressures caused by the 
commercial introduction of the Flavr Savr tomato along with other issues, and was purchased by Monsanto 
Corporation on April 1 1997. In the first quarter of 1997, Calgene had reported its first profit since it started 
to expand its operation ten years earlier (Martineau, 2001). 
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profitable if the pesticide and seed are marketed by the same firm so that the proper 
incentives can be used to maximize joint profits.10 Other GM crops are substitutes for 
pesticides, which does not encourage mergers and acquisitions because the increase in 
demand for one decreases the demand for the other.11 The intellectual property involved 
in a vertical market might also play a role in the vertical structure of the industry. Firms 
might vertically integrate to avoid opportunistic behaviour by the firm who holds the 
intellectual property rights. They might also become more closely vertically coordinated 
because the use of the intellectual property requires more than just a transfer of 
knowledge (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001).12    
The market share that individual firms hold in the market for seeds representative 
reflects the market concentration. The corn and soybean seed markets give a good 
indication of this concentration. DuPont and Monsanto have become two main 
competitors in this industry. Through its ownership of Pioneer Hi-bred International, 
DuPont held a 40% market share in corn seed and a 16% market share of the soybean 
seed markets in 1998 (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000). Monsanto, through 
acquisitions of former competitors Asgrow and DeKalb, held a 15% market share in the 
corn seed market and a 24% market share in the soybean seed market (Kalaitzandonakes 
and Hayenga, 2000). When combined with the control Monsanto has over germ plasm13, 
                                                        
10 For example, the herbicide Liberty, and LibertyLink and InVigor Canola Produced by Bayer 
CropScience. 
11 For example, Bt crops (i.e. potato) and the pesticide used to control damaging insects (i.e. Imicloprid).  
12 Fulton and Giannakas (2001) argue that the intangible assets such as the timing and other specifics 
involved in the steps of biotechnology are examples of the difficulty in licensing. This is overcome by 
including transformation services in the terms of the agreement. 
13 Charles (2001) explains that it is not only the intellectual property in genetics that influence the value of 
a new seed for a crop. The owner of the germ plasm also holds a lot of power because of the years of 
selective breeding that have gone into developing it. 
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the two companies combined to hold full ownership or influence over 80% of the corn 
seed market in the US in 1998 (Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga, 2000). 
With growth in the size and concentration of firms in the agricultural biotech 
industry comes concern over the market power that these firms possess. Brennan et al. 
(2000) estimated the four firm concentration ratio of firms developing plant 
biotechnology by studying US field trial data. The four firm concentration ratio increased 
from 64% in 1993 to 79% in 1998, mainly as a result of merger activity (Brennan et al., 
2000). This is a cause for concern for primary agricultural producers who are affected by 
the prices of inputs, including seed and pesticides. Also, all agricultural biotech firms 
interested in acquiring licenses to use the patent also will be affected by the market power 
of the firms holding the patents. To put the market power into perspective, Graff et al. 
(2003) show that Monsanto has 14% of all agbiotech patents in the US, followed by 
DuPont (13%), Syngenta (7%), Bayer (4%) and Dow (3%). These five firms hold a total 
of 41% of all agbiotech patents. The remainder of the private firms have 33%, while 
public institutions hold 24% (Graff et al., 2003).  
Although the previous point examines the potential complications in the US 
because of market concentration, the situation is complicated further by the fact that 
patent regulations and intellectual property rights differ substantially at an international 
level. In the case of functional foods derived from biotechnology, there could be multiple 
transgenes involving several patents from different countries (Kowalski et al., 2002). This 
complicated scenario could result in a multitude of negotiations for licenses, leading to 
potential innovations becoming infeasible. 
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Currently, licenses are negotiated bilaterally between the firm doing research on a 
new product or process and the owner of the intellectual property. There are limited 
standards in place and the negotiations are conducted on a case-by-case basis, which 
consumes time and resources. A possible solution to the inefficient manner in which 
licenses are currently negotiated is an independent clearinghouse for patents. Perhaps as a 
result of realizing the market power that they have with respect to patents, license holders 
have begun to market licenses rather than hold sole user status (Graff and Zilberman, 
2001). By facilitating the trading of licenses through a clearinghouse, several transaction 
costs could be reduced. First of all the information costs are reduced, because information 
concerning patented products/processes and the firms holding them would be well 
organized and easily accessible. Second, negotiation costs would be reduced because the 
clearinghouse would provide the institution necessary for the market to function.  
Graff and Zilberman (2001) identify three purposes of the IP clearinghouse: first, 
to identify the patents over technology available for licensing; second, to match buyers 
and sellers with standard yet flexible prices and contract terms; and third, to monitor and 
enforce the contracts. In order to maintain trust and ensure no conflicts of interest, a 
neutral party would be used to operate the IP clearinghouse (Graff and Zilberman, 2001). 
The closest instrument available at the present time is the Public Intellectual Property 
Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA). PIPRA offers public institutions the opportunity to 
submit copies of their patents and the status of licenses to be included in a database 
accessible to other researchers (PIPRA, 2005). It is not a clearinghouse, but this database 
could be the first prototype for a future clearinghouse. Presently this type of market does 
not exist for patents for private firms, meaning that new entrants attempting to develop 
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agricultural biotech innovations face information, market power, and limited resources 
problems. The result is a potential hold up for innovations in GM functional foods. Even 
if firms develop new technologies, the costs to obtaining the licenses to commercialize 
the product could be prohibitive.  
Functional foods produced from biotechnology may require access to multiple 
patents held by numerous firms. The best known case in Golden Rice, where for any 
single country it could be introduced in there is up to more than 40 patents applying to 
the product. Across different countries, there are more than 70 patents (Kryder et al., 
2000). This could easily be one of the main factors delaying the commercialization of 
Golden Rice.  
In the case of Golden Rice, Monsanto made the decision to share its proprietary 
information (Falcon and Fowler, 2002). Falcon and Fowler (2002) state that this decision 
followed a pledge by Novartis to provide seed technology to subsistence farmers at no 
charge. However, these are examples of products designed for markets in third world 
countries where there are no large rents to be distributed. The set back to 
commercialization of GM functional foods destined for markets in developed countries 
still remains because presumably the market for these products would create rents for the 
parties to bargain over. 
The next generation of GM research is focusing on more lucrative consumer 
markets in developed countries. For example, Monsanto is currently in the early 
development phase of producing soybeans with no saturated fat (Fraley, 2005). Firms 
holding patents to the genetic material needed to develop these functional foods will want 
to have access to rents that accrue from the development of these new technologies. 
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Therefore, there is the possibility that patent-holders could command a price for licenses 
which is too high to allow for a return to the potential licensee, meaning the research will 
not continue and commercialization will be held-up. This extreme example is unlikely 
given that the possible returns to the patent-holder from licensing could exceed the 
returns from maintaining exclusive access. Exclusive access to the intellectual property 
holds a lower value relative to the returns from licensing, in many cases because the 
owner of the intellectual property lacks the specialized knowledge held by the firm 
seeking the license (Bessen, 2004). The exception would be a firm that was developing a 
competitive or substitute product. Many licenses are required for processes involved in 
biotechnology that in no way are part of the traits shown by the final product. Bessen 
(2004) states that as long as the expected returns from gaining a license exceed the 
difference between the cost of research and development and the license cost, firms will 
obtain a license for the technology. It is also important to consider that often the initial 
innovators are solely researchers and have no intention to commercialize the product on 
their own. These firms rely on the income generated from licenses to cover the costs of 
research (Scotchmer, 2004). 
Overall, the set back caused by the transaction and licensing costs involved with 
gaining access to intellectual property is another potential cause of lack of 
commercialization of the functional foods derived from biotechnology. It is just one of 
several explanatory factors that should be considered.  
 
2.5.1  The supply chain effects of access to intellectual property issues  
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The fact that firms involved in developing the second generation of GM foods 
will likely have to make investments in IP licenses will cause reverberations throughout 
the supply chain. Transaction cost economics can be used as a framework to analyse the 
potential supply chain of GM functional foods in order to make inferences later in this 
thesis. 
The stylized supply chain for GM functional foods will likely be comprised of 
several levels. The supply chain could begin simply with the owner of knowledge or 
intellectual property. This intellectual property could be licensed to the agricultural 
biotech firm that will develop the seed. The agricultural biotech firm could then market 
the seed to producers who grow the seed and market it to processors. Within these last 
two stages the producer will be working through an agent, in most cases a crop inputs 
dealer and a grain buyer. The processor will then sell the finished processed goods to a 
wholesaler/retailer. At each one of these steps, the parties involved in the transaction 
would likely be involved in some type of contract. 
Williamson (1986) states that the conjunction of bounded rationality, 
opportunism and asset specificity is the basis for transaction costs. In the absence of any 
of these three factors a much simpler contract emerges (Williamson, 1986). Williamson 
(1986) describes the three factors as follows: bounded rationality when individuals are 
intendedly rational but only limitedly so (Simon, 1961, p.xxiv, cited in Williamson, 
1986), opportunism as self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1986, p. 177), and 
asset specificity, which is investment in an asset that holds little or no value in an 
alternate use or to an alternative user. These factors are likely to affect the supply chain 
for GM functional foods.  
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When compared to conventional agricultural crops, firms involved in the supply 
chain for GM functional foods will have to make relatively more specific investments. 
For instance, if licenses are purchased as a flat fee, that fee is a type of sunk cost. If the 
product is not commercialized that license will be worthless. The degree of asset 
specificity that the agricultural biotech firm faces by investing in the technology to 
develop a food depends on the degree to which the food is developed for a specific 
processor/retailer. Klein et al. (1978) state that when the degree of asset specificity 
increases, the amount of quasi-rents available increase simultaneously. As the quasi-rents 
increase the temptation for opportunistic behaviour increases, which will likely lead to 
vertical integration as the cost of contracting increases. In the area of agricultural 
biotechnology, and particularly with the production of GM functional foods, bounded 
rationality is an important issue to all parties involved. The lifescience firm must decide 
at least 10 years ahead of commercial introduction what type of health characteristic the 
consumer will demand. Consumer tastes are likely to change in that period of time as a 
result of alternative products and increased information. Also both sides have bounded 
rationality with regards to an unforeseen issue with the food following the commercial 
introduction. This leads to uncertainty at the onset of development and throughout the 
lifespan of potential GM functional foods.  
Further complicating the possible supply chain for GM functional foods is the 
fact that market concentration exists in the lifescience and food manufacturing industries. 
There is a small numbers bargaining problem. Presumably as a result of a patent on the 
functional seed, the agricultural biotech firm will have a monopoly. The food 
manufacturer might also negotiate a contract where they gain exclusive access to the 
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technology for food production, giving them a monopsony. In situations of bilateral 
monopoly, Williamson (1971) states that both price and quantity are negotiable. A 
stylized depiction of this situation is shown in the next chapter in Figure 3.1. In theory, 
the firms can maximize total profits by operating on the contract curve but in practice the 
parties will bargain over distribution of the rents which could lead to a sub-optimal 
solution. In this case any price that leads to non-negative rents for each party will be 
feasible (Williamson, 1971). The final outcome will depend on the relative bargaining 
power of the negotiating firms. When one considers the fact that there are bilateral 
monopoly negotiations possible between the patent-holder and agricultural biotech firm 
for licenses, and in turn the agricultural biotech firm, and the food manufacturer, the 
number of possible rent distribution scenarios becomes exhaustive. Williamson (1971) 
states that the transaction cost implications are that firms would be expected to vertically 
integrate in cases where the bargaining costs become high enough that the two firms 
would be better off working as one. The level of vertical coordination would also become 
higher as the level of trust declines (Williamson, 1971). This situation is further 
complicated if access to intellectual property must be negotiated with two or more 
intellectual property owners. 
In todays marketplace, firms commonly form strategic alliances between one 
another as a less drastic option to complete integration. The form of strategic alliance 
ranges from a license to an equity joint venture, which is referred to as least hierarchical 
and most hierarchical respectively by Oxley (1997). This is a possible outcome for the 
supply chain of the next generation of biotech products. Oxley (1997) gives several 
hierarchical outcomes for strategic alliances depending on several characteristics of the 
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transaction. The paper makes five observations predicting likely hierarchical structures 
given transaction characteristics. The observations state that a more hierarchical structure 
will be formed if: (1) the alliance involved a product or process design as compared to a 
marketing or production alliance, (2) there are a broad range of products or technologies, 
(3) the transactions take place over a wide geographic area, and (4) the parties are 
involved in few rather than many alliances together (Oxley, 1997). Following the logic of 
this paper, the supply chain for GM functional foods could possibly have several 
hierarchical levels depending on the specific product being produced and the parties 
involved.  
This section shows that the transaction cost effects resulting from the need to 
gain freedom to operate, along with the fact that there is monopoly power at either end of 
the supply chain leads to a complex set of supply chain interactions.  
 
2.6  Summary 
This chapter begins by giving a background to the issue, including definitions and 
the regulatory environment for functional foods in Canada, the US and the EU. The 
regulatory environment, especially in Canada is uncertain. Health claims for functional 
foods are currently being approved on an ad hoc basis and the remainder of the sector 
remains in regulatory limbo. This does not give innovators a clear idea of what type of 
regulation will exist in ten years time when ideas currently under development become 
ready for commercialization. This regulatory uncertainty is one potential contributor to 
the set back to commercialization of the next generation of GM products. 
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The consumer literature pertaining to GM foods shows that there is aversion to 
GM foods. When given the choice, most consumers would opt for conventionally 
produced foods over a similar GM food. However, there is some evidence of willingness 
to pay for GM foods that provide consumers with health benefits. The issue then becomes 
whether it is worth the risk for a food manufacturer to invest in developing new foods 
that might reflect negatively on their brand as a whole. Consumer perception of a product 
can change rapidly as a result of unforeseen negative news regarding an issue such as 
food safety. A recall of a GM functional food could damage the value of the firm and 
brand as a whole. These factors add to the uncertainty involved in investing in GM 
functional foods, lending another reason for potential delay in commercialization. 
Finally, the literature relating to the issue of freedom to operate and the effects on 
the supply chain as a whole is discussed. The result of the necessity to gain access to 
intellectual property is increased transaction costs to the supply chain as a whole. There is 
a lack of an institution to facilitate the exchange of information regarding IP, including 
terms of exchange and a basis for pricing. In the case of development of GM functional 
foods, numerous pieces of intellectual property may have to be licensed. As a result of 
the institutional shortcomings and the number of licenses required, there will be large 
transaction costs involved in obtaining the licenses necessary to proceed with further 
development of GM functional foods. This combined with the fact that there are rents to 
be distributed by bilateral monopolies at multiple levels of the supply chain, means that 
the contract negotiation becomes extremely complex. The combination of factors will not 
only lead to higher transaction costs, but also the multiple levels of bilateral monopoly 
will lead to a potential hold-up problem because of the difficulty in distributing rent. 
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This chapter provides evidence from existing literature highlighting the conditions 
with the potential to cause a set back to the commercialization of GM functional foods. 
The literature and background in this chapter are the basis of deeper analysis presented in 
subsequent chapters. The next chapter presents a theoretical analysis of these issues. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 
3.1  Examining the vertical market  
 When analysing the possibility for a set back in the commercialization of GM 
functional foods, it is helpful to conceptualize the situation as a vertical market. From the 
model of the vertical market, the potential problems can be analysed, and circumstances 
where there is expected to be success or failure can be explained. The following sections 
analyse and model the three problems that contribute to the delay to commercialization of 
GM functional foods: regulatory uncertainty, the set back at the food manufacturing level 
resulting from the risk to the brand image exceeding the benefit gained from consumer 
demand, and costs associated with gaining the access to intellectual property. 
As indicated at the end of the previous chapter, the supply chain in the GM 
functional food market can be visualized as several levels. To simplify the analysis, the 
three levels shown in Figure 3.1 will be used. The furthest upstream firm is the 
lifescience firm, followed by the primary producer of the crop and the food manufacturer. 
 In conventional farming, the producer purchases seed from the lifescience firm 
and sells to the food manufacturer either through a contract or in a spot market 
transaction. The producer, being perfectly competitive, gains zero economic profits. 
Assuming the producer receives a premium to grow the GM functional food crop, but 
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also pays a premium in seed and management costs, the net economic gain for producers 
to grow GM functional food will be assumed to be zero. For this reason, it is assumed 
that the producer has no market power. As a result, the main focus of the theoretical 
chapter is on the lifescience firm and the food manufacturer. It is assumed that the 
producer enters into a resource-providing production contract with the food 
manufacturer. This means the food manufacturer provides the seed to the producer, who 
grows the crop in an agreed upon method for the manufacturer. The manufacturer will 
negotiate a contract with the lifescience firm that allows them exclusive access to the 
technology. 
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Figure 3.1. The vertical market for GM functional foods 
 
 The lifescience firm is assumed to be a monopoly, because they own exclusive 
rights to the seed technology as a result of patents on the genetics. The assumption is not 
unreasonable given that it would make sense intuitively that only one firm market the 
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seed. The lifescience firm sets its quantity through a derived demand function constructed 
from the demand that the food manufacturer faces. The derived demand that the 
lifescience firm faces (Db) is equivalent to Dm - pf shown in Figure 3.1. The lifescience 
firm, being a monopoly, will maximize its profits if it sets quantity at the point where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. In Figure 3.1, the optimal quantity for the 
lifescience firm to produce is q1. If the quantity is set at the optimal level for the 
monopoly lifescience firm, the total rents distributed between the lifescience firm and the 
food manufacturer through bargaining will be equal to area pmade.  
The supply chain is further complicated because the food manufacturer is 
assumed to have monopsonistic power. The monopsony situation is shown in Figure 3.1. 
The food manufacturer will have a different objective function than the monopoly 
lifescience firm. The monopsony food manufacturer will set optimal quantity from the 
marginal expenditure curve (MEn), which is derived from the supply curve. The optimal 
quantity is set where MEn is equal to Dm and is equal to q2. The optimal price for the 
monopsonist to charge the consumer then becomes pn. The price that the monopsonist 
pays the producer is shown by point f. The rent available for negotiation in the supply 
chain is equal to area pnbcf under the optimal solution for the monopsonist. 
This situation is known as a bilateral monopoly, and the number of possible 
solutions is large. The lifescience firm and the food manufacturer will have to bargain 
over both the quantity and price. The final quantity will be between q1 and q2 and the 
final consumer price will be between pn and pm. The final solution will depend on the 
relative bargaining power of the two firms involved. Once the firms agree on a price and 
quantity, they must bargain over the distribution of the resulting rent.   
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The lifescience firm is a monopoly, and can exert some market power given that 
there may be more than one food manufacturer involved in the initial negotiations. 
Following the initial contract, the food manufacturer could gain exclusive access to the 
GM functional food and therefore gain monopsony power. Initially, the food 
manufacturer will not enter into a contract where they make lower profits than their next 
best alternative. An outside option in this case is to continue to produce conventional 
foods, assuming that the food manufacturer is already established. Therefore, there will 
be a balance in distributing the rents so that both the food manufacturer and the 
lifescience firm have an incentive to invest.  
 The potential set back occurs if the cost of R&D plus licensing costs for the 
lifescience firm is not recovered from the rents gained from consumers. The lifescience 
firm passes its costs to the grower in the form of a fee for use. The grower must pay this 
fee and incur additional handling and management costs because of the special care 
required to ensure the functional trait is passed onto the food manufacturer. In order for 
the grower to consider growing the GM functional food, they will have to be 
compensated for their extra costs by the food manufacturer. The food manufacturer will 
have to make a premium from the GM functional food at least large enough to 
compensate the grower and leave them as well off as they would be with an alternate 
product. Using backward induction, if the lifescience firm realizes that the food 
manufacturer has no incentive to develop GM functional food products, it will hold back 
future resources that might otherwise be committed toward developing new technologies. 
The bilateral monopoly situation within a vertical market setting frames the discussion of 
the three sources of delays to commercialization that follows. 
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3.2  The effect of government policy uncertainty on the expected profits of the 
monopolist 
Recall that section 2.3 gives an overview of some of the regulations that are in 
place in Canada, the US and the EU. It also discusses some of the uncertainty and 
regulatory limbo for functional foods, especially in Canada. This section develops a 
model to explain the effect that the regulatory uncertainty has on the expected profit of 
the monopolist lifescience firm and the effect this has on the decision to innovate. 
The lifescience firm has the objective function to maximize profits. The simple 
objective function can be written as follows: 
IQCQQP bbbb −−= )(;...)(π                                             (16) 
 In this case bπ is the profit the lifescience firm receives from the innovation. 
;...)( bQP represents the derived demand curve for the GM functional food. It is derived 
by calculating the difference between the demand that the food manufacturer faces (Dm) 
and the price the producer receives (MCf=Pf ). )( bQC  is the cost that the lifescience firm 
faces, with the exception of the fixed R&D costs which are represented by I. 
 However, investments in R&D are never made with certainty that there will be 
success. The investment is made based on the expectation that the profits gained will be 
larger than the investment made into R&D. If there were a single firm competing in R&D 
the objective function of the firm would be: 
[ ] IQCQQPE bbbb −−= )(;...)(απ                                           (17)14 
In this case, α  ( ]1,0[∈α ) represents the probability that the R&D will result in 
the successful development of a GM functional food, and the profit function becomes an 
                                                        
14 This equation was adapted from Shy, 1995. 
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expectation. The lifescience firm bases the investment decision on the following 
requirements: 



=
0
I
Investment   [ ]
otherwise
IQCQQPif bbb ≥− )(;...)(α                                         (18) 
 The firm will invest in the R&D if the probability of success multiplied by firm 
profit is greater than the level of investment put into R&D. However, normally there is 
more than one firm competing to develop and patent a technology first. In a situation 
where there are two firms competing to innovate first, the expected profit for firm i would 
be: 
( )[ ] [ ] IQCQQPQCQQPE bibibbibibbi −−+−−= 2
)(;...)(
)(;...)(1
2α
ααπ               (19) 
 In this expected profit function, [ ])(;...)()1( bibib QCQQP −−αα  represents only 
firm i being successful in R&D, while [ ]
2
)(;...)(2 bibib QCQQP −α  represents both firms 
being successful. For both firms to invest in R&D, it is sufficient for the following 
condition to hold: 
[ ] IQCQQP bibib ≥−−
2
)(;...)()2( αα
                                        (20) 
 If the condition is satisfied, each firm will invest an equivalent amount in R&D 
equal to I. The expected profit in the case where there is a single firm will be greater than 
or equal to the expected profit in the case where there are two firms if the following 
condition holds: 
[ ]
)2(
2)(;...)(
α−
≥− bibib QCQQP                                          (21) 
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 Intuitively, one would hypothesize that as the number of firms competing to 
innovate increases, the expected profit from investing in R&D for each firm will 
decrease. This is the case with this model. 
 The key parameter in this model is α. One would expect that there would be a 
negative relationship between the level of regulatory uncertainty and the value of α. This 
means that when the regulatory uncertainty is high, the lifescience firm will expect the 
probability of successful commercialization of an innovation to decrease. This will result 
in a lower expected profit. Similar to the explanation in section 3.1, the profits or rents, 
must be bargained over between the food manufacturer and the lifescience firm. The 
expected rents of the lifescience firm must be high enough to compensate for the amount 
spent on research and development, or the firm will have no incentive to invest. 
 Another key component that is omitted from this model is time. Another part of 
government regulatory uncertainty that is important to innovators is the potential for 
delays in the regulatory process. As the time to approval lengthens, the potential product 
lifespan and returns on investment decrease. Also, competitors have more time to 
innovate and develop competing products. If time was included in this model the 
expected profit would be further reduced when government regulatory uncertainty 
increased. 
 
3.3  The consumer and branding problem15  
 For the purposes of this analysis, it is useful to view the consumers who are 
consuming the product as having heterogeneous preferences. A useful instrument for this 
                                                        
15 This section has been developed with reference to Fulton and Giannakas, 2004 and Giannakas and 
Fulton, 2002. Also guidance was received from Dr. Murray Fulton, Professor, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Saskatchewan. 
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analysis is the address model discussed by Hotelling (1929). Variations of this model 
have been used to model several problems. It has been used specifically to model 
heterogeneous consumer preferences towards GM foods (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; 
Giannakas and Fulton, 2002). This is the type of model that will be used to show 
consumer demand for GM functional foods. 
The heterogeneous consumer model abstracts from the vertical market model in 
Figures 3.1, 3.8 and 3.9. This is because the heterogeneous consumer preference model 
has more competitive market features compared to the bilateral monopoly shown in the 
vertical market models. The heterogeneous consumer model has no strategic interaction 
or strategic pricing. This could be a potential limitation of the model.  
The prices discussed in the heterogeneous consumer model are assumed to be 
equal to marginal cost. Therefore, it would follow that if the cost of bringing a product to 
market increases, the price of the good would increase as well. It will be assumed that the 
marginal cost for each good is equivalent to the values of P discussed in this section. 
 For the analysis, the market will be assumed to consist of a three goods. One of 
these goods is the GM functional food produced by a national brand firm. The second 
good is a conventional good produced by a national brand food firm, and the third is a 
conventional food that is a substitute for the other two. Consumers choose the goods 
according to the base utility they provide and the price of the goods. The consumers in 
this model are differentiated by the characteristic c, where [ ]1,0∈c . The characteristic c 
captures the differences in willingness to pay between consumers.  
The first model expresses a different situation than, the national branded 
conventional good and the substitute good. This scenario is shown in Figure 3.2. In this 
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two-good market, the share of the substitute is equal to SS, while the share of the national 
brand conventional good is SA. The utility gained from consuming the respective goods 
are calculated as follows. 
cPUU SSS γ−−=                                                       (7) 
)1( cPUU AAA −−−= λ                                                  (8) 
 
Figure 3.2. Two-good market prior to GM functional food introduction 
 
The variables SU and AU represent the base utility that consumers receive from 
consuming the substitute and national brand good respectively, while PS and PA are their 
respective prices. The base utilities will differ according to the value that is associated 
with consuming a national brand or substitute branded product. The non-negative factors 
discounting the differentiating characteristic of the consumer are γ for the substitute good 
and λ for the national brand good. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between total utility, shown on the vertical axes, 
and the differentiated consumer characteristic c, shown on the horizontal axis. The 
horizontal axis can be viewed as the range of consumer characteristics. At any given 
value of c the consumer will choose the good which maximizes their utility. The marginal 
consumer exists at point c1 in Figure 3.2. This consumer is indifferent about whether to 
consume the conventional food or the substitute. All the consumers with c values 
between 0 and c1 will consume the substitute food in this case, while those between c1 
and 1 will consume the conventional food.  
To determine the respective shares of the two goods, UA is equated to US. The 
intersection point is formed as a result. This point is equivalent to c1 on the horizontal 
axis. The market shares of the two goods are represented by SA and SS for the national 
branded conventional product and the substitute respectively. SS is equal to the distance 
between 0 and c1, while SA is equivalent to the distance between c1 and 1. The goods are 
substitutes; therefore the shares depend on the relative base utility gained from 
consumption, the relative prices of the two goods and the discount factors. 
γλ
λ
+
+−+−
==
SAAS
S
PPUU
cS 1                                         (9) 
γλ
γ
+
+−+−
=−=
ASSA
A
PPUU
cS 11                                      (10) 
The interest to this thesis is the effect of introducing a GM functional food to the 
market. It will be assumed that the firm owning the national brand introduces the GM 
functional food as part of its brand offering. It is also possible that the substitute firm, or 
a new entrant to the market could introduce the GM functional food. The total utility a 
consumer receives from consuming the functional food is shown by Equation 11. In this 
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case FU  is the base utility from consuming a GM functional food, PF is the price and µ  
is the discount factor on the differentiated consumer attribute c. It is important to consider 
what proportion of the GM functional food will be purchased by the core national brand 
consumers, and what proportion will be consumed by new consumers who substitute 
away from the substitute product.  
)1( cPUU FFF −−−= µ                                        (11) 
If Figure 3.2 is compared to Figure 3.3, the effect of the addition of the functional 
food can be seen. Now there is a third share that is included in the market. SF represents 
the share of the GM functional food. Note that the share of both the national branded 
conventional food and the substitute are reduced with the introduction of the GM 
functional food. The respective shares are found by equating the utility curves to find the 
corresponding c value of the intersection points. The intersection points of interest are 
shown in Figure 3.3 as c1 and c2.  
 
Figure 3.3. Three-good market following introduction of GM functional food 
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The distance between the intersection points or points of indifference are the 
respective market shares. 
µγ
µ
+
+−+−
==
SFFS
S
PPUU
cS 1                                        (12) 
The market share of the national brand conventional food is equal to the 
difference between 1 and the intersection point represented by c2.  
µλ
µλ
−
−+−+−
=
FAAF PPUUc2                                        (13) 
µλ −
−+−
=−=
AFFA
A
PPUUcS 21                                        (14) 
 The remaining market share is taken by the GM functional food. It is calculated 
by taking the difference between the intersection points c2 and c1. 
))((
)()()()()()()(
12 µγµλ
µλγλγµλµγµλµγλγ
+−
−++−−+++−−+−+
=−=
FSASAF
F
PPPUUU
ccS
 (15) 
 
The national brand firm will be interested in the effect that the introduction of the 
GM functional food will have on the brand as a whole. In this case it will be the effect on 
the national brands conventional food. This can be measured by the change in the base 
utility (
A
U ) from consumption of the conventional food after the introduction of the GM 
functional food. For example, consider a case where there is negative press concerning 
the association between the national brand firm and a lifescience firm in the production of 
the GM functional food. This would lower the base utility for the GM functional food 
(
F
U ) along with 
A
U  because of consumer backlash towards the brand as a whole. This 
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would result in a shift down of the utility curves for the GM functional food and the 
conventional food as shown in Figure 3.4. 
In Figure 3.4, the change in the market share of the conventional food is reduced 
to SA. However, the extent of this reduction depends on the change in 'AU  relative to the 
change in '
F
U . A specific problem with the GM functional food, such as a batch with bad 
flavour, might lower the base utility of the GM functional food substantially relative to 
the conventional food. Alternatively, a food safety concern involving the GM functional 
food, such as negative health effects of the functional characteristic, could lower the base 
utilities of consuming the GM functional food and the conventional food because of the 
tainted brand image. In any case, the total market share of the national brand, including 
the GM functional food and the conventional food will be reduced by 1
'
1 cc −  in Figure 
3.4. Firms contemplating manufacturing GM functional food will not only be concerned 
with the change in market share in Figure 3.4, but also how that relates to the market 
share they have in Figure 3.2, before they expand their brand to include GM functional 
foods.  
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Figure 3.4. The results of a problem which damages the brand image 
 
The base utility values for the conventional food and the GM functional food can 
be looked at as the method of conveying the effects discussed by Cabral (2000). At the 
initial introduction of the GM functional food, the direct reputation effect that the 
national brand has affects the initial willingness-to-pay of the consumer. After consumers 
have some experience with the GM functional food (personal and knowledge gained 
through media), the feedback reputation effect influences the willingness-to-pay for both 
the GM functional food and the conventional food. Finally, the overall image of the brand 
in terms of firm quality is influenced by the signalling effect. All of these effects will be 
signalled through the base utility that consumers have for the national brand firms 
products.  
The introduction of the GM functional food could have the opposite effect on the 
market shares of the conventional and GM functional food, if the situation is reversed in 
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Figure 3.4. If the utility curves shift up as a result of an increase in base utility from '
F
U  
to 
F
U  for the functional food and '
A
U to 
A
U for the conventional food, the firm will 
realize a definite benefit from introducing the GM functional food. This type of change 
would be realized if the introduction of the functional food provided a positive feedback 
reputation effect and signalling effect towards the value of the brand, and in turn the 
products it offers. 
 In cases where the food manufacturer predicts that they will gain no market share 
for the GM functional food, it will not be introduced. This is the situation shown in 
Figure 3.5. There are a couple of main causes that can alone or in combination cause this 
scenario to take place. First, if the GM functional food does not provide a significant 
enough health benefit to raise FU  high enough in comparison to AU  to compensate for 
the price difference between the two goods, it will not gain demand. Second, even if the 
GM functional food provides a significant health benefit, if the cost to bring to the market 
and in turn the price is too high, there will be no market demand. Also a combination of 
these two factors could lead to zero market share for the functional food as shown in 
Figure 3.5. In this case there is no incentive for the national brand firm to introduce the 
product. Finally, the firm will have to make enough additional revenue from the addition 
in market share resulting from the introduction of the GM functional food to compensate 
for the increase in costs. 
The situation shown in Figure 3.5 could also occur following the product 
introduction. If the GM functional food does not provide a functional characteristic that 
satisfies the health claim it makes, consumers will be unwilling to pay a premium price to 
purchase the food. Also, if the food has undesirable characteristics such as poor flavour, 
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the base utility of consumers who originally valued the health quality will diminish. All 
of these factors will cause a decrease in the value of 
F
P
F
U − , resulting in a reduction in 
market share and eventually zero market share as shown in Figure 3.5. This can also be 
linked to the regulatory uncertainty that exists. A similar effect on the value of FU  would 
occur if the food were unable to make the health claim required to increase its value.  
 
Figure 3.5. The case in which the GM functional food carries zero market share 
 
 An important factor is the demand for the functional attribute that the GM 
functional food provides to the consumer, and the effectiveness of the product itself. In 
this model the functional attribute will affect the base utility (
''
FU ) that the product 
provides the consumer. The effects on market share of the GM functional foods caused 
by a boost to the value of 
F
P
F
U −  ceteris paribus is shown in Figure 3.6. In this 
situation, the share SF increases, the share SS decreases and the share SA decreases 
substantially. This situation shows that the firm marketing the GM functional food will 
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want to do research into attributes that target health issues that consumers place a high 
value on.  
 
 
Figure 3.6.  The effect of a highly demanded functional trait or price reduction on 
the GM functional food 
 
Another cause of the shift shown in Figure 3.6 is the reduction in price of the GM 
functional food. Even if the consumers do not find the functional characteristic overly 
attractive, they might purchase it if the premium is small. However, the food 
manufacturer producing the GM functional food will want an increase in market share to 
be due to a boost in base utility, or a change in the discount factor. If increased market 
share is as a result of a price decrease, it means the price is closer to the price of the 
conventional food. Since it is assumed that the two are under the same brand and the 
largest gain in the market share of the functional food is gained from the conventional 
food, the manufacturer will hope that gain will result in higher margins. If the transfer of 
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market share from the conventional food to the GM functional food does not result in 
higher margins, the firm will only gain from the market share gained from the substitute 
good. Also, this model does not take into account the additional research and 
development cost of producing the GM functional food. If the main effect is a change in 
market share from the conventional food to the GM functional food without an increase 
in the margin the food processor is able to receive, it will not be an attractive investment 
for the firm. 
Another factor to take into consideration that will have an effect on the market 
shares of the respective goods is their relative prices. Since total utility is the difference 
between the base utility and the price, excluding the differentiating characteristic, if the 
price increases it will result in a shift down of the utility curve. In Figure 3.6, an increase 
in the price of the GM functional food ceteris paribus will cause a shift down in the 
utility curve for the GM functional food. If large enough, the effect could be a shift from 
F
P
F
U −''  to 
F
P
F
U − . This shows that for any one product to succeed there is a balance 
that must be struck between the base utility, price and discount factor so that a market 
share is attainable to provide a sustainable return. 
 The discount factors will also have an effect on the size of the market shares that 
are available to all firms. If the discount parameters of either γ, λ orµ increases ceteris 
paribus, the market share of the respective product will decrease. The value of the 
discount parameter will be affected by the perceived quality of the product. For example, 
the GM functional food shares several characteristics with the conventional product 
under the same brand. However, the discount parameter is smaller because of the 
additional health benefits it provides. If the health benefits for the functional food are 
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small, its discount parameter will be closer to the value of the discount parameter of the 
conventional food. Another factor that will have an effect is taste. Consumers want a food 
that tastes good. The GM food could have a good health benefit, but if it does not taste 
good the discount parameter will increase closer to that of the conventional alternative.  
Recall that the value of c is the individuals unique characteristic that affects their 
willingness to pay, which is discounted by the parameters γ, λ orµ. If the discount 
parameters increase, the slope of the utility curve will increase in absolute terms. No 
matter which parameter increases, ceteris paribus, the share of that good will decrease. 
This case is shown below in Figure 3.7. The situation from Figure 3.6 is altered so that µ 
increases ceteris paribus. The total utility at the right axis is still equal to 
F
P
F
U −'' ; 
however because of the increase in µ the share of the GM functional food decreases to 
SF. The shares of the other two goods increase as a result. The share of the substitute 
(SS) increases by the difference between '''1c  and ''1c , while the share of the 
conventional food (SA) increases by the difference between ''2c  and '''2c .  
 72
 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  The effect of a change in the discount factor on market share 
  
It is important to note that this model has only considered only GM functional 
food introduction by a national brand firm. The national brand firm must consider the 
effect of the new food on the firm as a whole. Another situation that could be analysed is 
if the GM functional food was introduced by a new entrant to the industry. If a new 
entrant introduced the GM functional food, the considerations with respect to the change 
in aggregate firm revenue compared to costs would not arise. The new entrant would 
solely be concerned with the market share that could be gained for the GM functional 
food.  
The analysis of this model also assumes that the size of the pie to be divided 
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decrease, but that would not necessarily correspond in a decrease in demand for that 
product.  
 
3.4  Numerical simulation of the consumer and branding problem  
To further facilitate the understanding of the model developed in Section 3.3, it is 
valuable to perform some numerical simulation. The simulation was performed using the 
Solver tool in Microsoft Excel. The purpose of the model is to show numerically the 
effect of changes in the variables and parameters on the market share of the functional 
food.  
The simulation results are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.316. Since there are no 
commercialized GM functional foods in the marketplace at this time, it was necessary to 
use hypothetical values to determine the potential market shares of the three goods. The 
main purpose of the simulation model is to conduct sensitivity analysis in order to 
determine what effect changes in the base utility, price and discount factor for the 
functional food will have on its market share, while holding the values equal for the 
conventional and substitute goods constant.  
The product that is examined in the simulation model is tomato paste. This 
product is used because it is realistically one of the products that could be developed as a 
GM functional food. There are studies underway, as mentioned previously, to increase 
the lycopene levels in tomatoes through transgenics. Also, one of the cases in the next 
chapter discusses tomato paste. The case illustrates a GM tomato paste that was sold 
under private label in the United Kingdom with some success, but removed from the 
                                                        
16 The methodology used to perform the simulation is shown in the appendix to the thesis. 
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market because of increased opposition to GM foods. Another reason for the choice of 
tomato paste is that there is little to differentiate between when choosing a tomato paste 
besides the brand, and potentially if there is a functional characteristic. 
The prices for the GM functional food are all hypothetical; however the prices for 
the conventional and substitute goods are actual prices gathered from a Safeway grocery 
store in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan in 2005. For the purposes of the simulation analysis, it 
will be assumed that there are only two firms in the market for tomato paste. The first is 
the conventional product, which in this case will be the national brand product. It had an 
in-store price of $0.99 per 156 ml can. The substitute product will be the stores own-
brand tomato paste. The in-store price of the own-brand tomato paste was $0.75 per 156 
ml can. For the simulation model, these prices were converted to $0.63 and $0.48 per 100 
ml respectively.  
Table 3.1 shows the initial situation that is used in the two-good market prior to 
the introduction of the GM functional tomato paste. The two scenarios are a two-good 
market with a 50-50 market share originally and a two-good market with a 70-30 market 
share originally. In the latter scenario the firm with the 70% market share introduces the 
GM functional food. In both cases the national brand is assumed to introduce the 
functional food, similar to the theoretical model. 
 
Table 3.1. The original two-good market prior to introduction of the GM functional 
food. 
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In the 50-50 market share scenario, the national branded tomato paste has a 
higher base utility (
A
U = 3.5769) compared to the substitute tomato paste (
S
U = 3.4231), 
but also had a price (
A
P ) that was $0.15/100ml higher than that of the substitute (
S
P ). 
Therefore the total utility on the left and right axes (see any of Figures 3.2 to 3.9 for 
visual graph) were equivalent. The discount factors λ and γ were each equivalent to 1, 
which was the maximum value these parameters were restricted to. 
In the 70-30 market share scenario, the national branded tomato paste begins with 
a 70% market share (SA), while the substitute tomato paste has a 50% market share (SS). 
The base utility of the national brand tomato paste ( 
A
U  ) was 3.6428, while the base 
utility of the substitute ( 
S
U  ) was 3.3572. The discount factors λ and γ were equal to 0.50 
and 0.73 respectively. The prices (
A
P and 
S
P ) in this scenario are equivalent to those in 
the 50-50 scenario.  
The values in the two-good market remain static throughout the respective 
scenarios, with exception to the market shares of the two goods (SA and SS). The price 
values explained earlier were inserted to the model, and the remainder of the values were 
generated using Solver in order to give the desired two-good market share prior to 
introduction of the GM functional food to the market. 
 
3.4.1  Simulation with market shares of 50-50  
The first situation examined a situation where the conventional and substitute 
goods equally divided the market prior to the introduction of the GM functional tomato 
paste. The values generated to give a 50-50 market share scenario in the two-good market 
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were then transferred to a similar model set up for the three-good market. The values for 
the functional tomato paste were generated to achieve a 10% market share, which also 
affected the market share of the original two goods. The results are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2. Scenario 1: 50/50 original market share 
 
The scenario which would give the GM functional tomato paste a 10% market 
share was then solved for keeping the values for the two other goods constant. The base 
utility of the GM functional tomato paste was equivalent to that of the conventional 
tomato paste under the same brand (
F
U = 3.5769). This base utility can be explained as 
capturing the value that the consumers place on the brand. Therefore, intuitively it makes 
sense that it would be equivalent at initial introduction as a result of the direct reputation 
effect. The generated price of the functional tomato paste is substantially higher than 
either the conventional or substitute tomato paste. The price (
F
P ) is $1.08/100ml which 
is a 71% premium over the conventional food. This premium is offset by a much lower 
discount rate (µ) equal to 0.01 compared to the discount rate of 1 for the other two goods. 
The discount rate is lower because of the functional characteristic the functional tomato 
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paste provides the consumer. The solution was set up to give a share to the GM 
functional tomato paste (
F
S ) of 10%. The market shares of the other goods were each 
reduced from 50% to 44.9% for the conventional tomato paste (
A
S ) and 45.1% for the 
substitute tomato paste (
S
S ). 
Several shocks are then introduced to this base case, keeping the prices, base 
utilities and discount parameters of the conventional and substitute goods constant. These 
shocks are listed as the Situations from 2 through 9 in Table 3.2. The values that changed 
in these situations are shaded in grey in the table. Situation 2 raised the base utility of the 
functional food by 1% to observe the effect on the market shares of the three goods. The 
increase changes the base utility of the functional food to 3.6127 from 3.5769. This could 
be the result of positive consumer experiences as a result of consuming the functional 
tomato paste. The result of this boost in base utility is an increase in market share (
F
S ) 
from 10% to just over 17%. The market share of the conventional tomato paste (
A
S ) 
decreases from 44.9% to 41.3% and the market share of the substitute tomato paste (
S
S ) 
decreases from 45.1% to 41.5%. Situation 3 in Scenario 1 shows the impact of a 5% 
increase in the base utility of the functional tomato paste. The base utility of the 
functional tomato paste becomes 3.7558. This increases the market share of the 
functional tomato paste to 45.8%, while the market shares of the conventional tomato 
paste and substitute tomato paste fall to 26.8% and 27.4% respectively. Also of interest 
was the base utility under this scenario that would cause the share of the functional 
tomato paste to become zero. The results are shown in Situation 4 in Table 3.2. The base 
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utility value that causes the market share of the functional tomato paste to become zero 
was 3.5269 which was a 1.4% decrease from the base scenario.  
The next set of sensitivities was performed by changing the price of the 
functional tomato paste, while keeping all the other variables constant. As stated earlier, 
the base scenario had a price premium of 71%. First the price was reduced so that it was 
only at a 50% premium to the conventional tomato paste (Situation 5 in Table 3.2). The 
new price was $0.95/100ml compared to $1.08/100 ml. The result of this change was an 
increase to 35.4% market share from 10% market share for the functional tomato paste, a 
reduction from 44.9% to 32.1% for the conventional tomato paste and from 45.1% to 
32.5% for the substitute tomato paste. Also, it was important to determine the price that 
would cause the market share of the functional tomato paste to become zero (Situation 6 
in Table 3.2). The solution showed that if the price of the tomato paste (
F
P ) increased 
from $1.08 to $1.13/100ml under the base scenario, the share of the functional tomato 
paste would become zero, and the share of the other two goods would become 50% 
apiece. 
Finally, the effect of the discount parameter µ was simulated in the model 
(Situations 7, 8 and 9 in Table 3.2). The original value of µ was 0.01. The value of µ was 
adjusted to be 0.1 and the effects on the market shares of the three goods were measured. 
It is important to note that a different base situation was used for this calculation. The 
new base is Situation 2 in Table 3.2 where the base utility of the functional tomato paste 
is increased by 1% (recall that the original base was Situation 1 in Table 3.2). This is 
because basically no change in µ was possible without creating zero market share for the 
functional tomato paste under the original base situation. The effect of the increase in µ is 
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a decrease of the market share of the functional tomato paste from 17.2% (Situation 2 in 
Table 3.2) to 8.3% (Situation 7 in Table 3.2). The conventional tomato paste market share 
increased to 45.2% (Situation 2 in Table 3.2) from 41.3% (Situation 7 in Table 3.2), 
while the market share of the substitute increased from 41.5% (Situation 2 in Table 3.2) 
to 46.2% (Situation 7 in Table 3.2).  
The next test was to determine what the market share of the functional tomato 
paste would be if the value of µ were zero. The result was a market share of 18.3% for the 
functional tomato paste, 40.8% for the conventional and 40.9% for the substitute 
(Situation 8 in Table 3.2). The value of µ that resulted in zero market share for the GM 
functional food was also calculated (Situation 9 in Scenario 1). The result was a µ value 
of 0.18. Once again this leads to each of the conventional and substitute tomato paste 
products holding a 50% market share. 
Overall, under the scenarios solved with the two firms initially holding a 50% 
market share we can show the sensitivity the model shows towards change. A small 
shock to the base utility, or discount parameter led to a relatively large change in market 
shares. If the market for tomato paste was sensitive similar to this simulation, there would 
be a lot of risk to the food manufacturer. Any change in consumer perceptions regarding 
the GM functional food will have a large effect on not only the share of that product, but 
also on their conventional product. It is also useful to start with a different base situation. 
The next sub-section will start with the market share divided with the conventional 
tomato paste holding 70% and the substitute tomato paste holding 30%. 
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3.4.2  Simulation with market shares of 70-30  
The simulations completed with the original market shares of the conventional 
and substitute tomato pastes holding respective market shares of 70% and 30% were 
carried out with the same methodology as the previous sub-section. The results are shown 
in Situations 10 through 18 under Scenario 2 in Table 3.3. Some of the shocks were 
introduced slightly different because the same shocks in the first model did not fit well in 
this scenario. Once again the GM functional tomato paste was added to the original 
market and the situation solved so that it gained an initial 10% market share. The original 
base utility for the functional tomato paste (
F
U ) was equivalent to the base utility of the 
conventional tomato paste (
A
U ), which was a value of 3.6428. The base utility for the 
substitute tomato paste (
S
U ) was 3.3572. The original price of the functional tomato 
paste (
F
P ) was $0.94, which is lower than in the first model, but still about a 50% 
premium to the price of the conventional tomato paste (
A
P ). The reason the original price 
of the functional food was lower in Scenario 2 was that the two-good market was set with 
different market shares. As a result when Solver calculated the situation that would give 
the functional food a 10% market share, the price of the GM functional food was lower. 
The value of the parameters µ, λ and γ were 0.02, 0.50 and 0.73 respectively. Once again, 
as a result of the functional characteristic, the discount rate for the functional food is 
much lower than that of the other two goods at 0.02. Under Scenario 2 the situation was 
simulated that gave the conventional food a higher market share (70%) in the two-good 
market. As a result the discount parameter of the conventional food became smaller, 
relative to that of the substitute. With such a large share of the market in the two-good 
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market, the conventional tomato paste must have been a more popular product with 
consumers relative to the conventional tomato paste in Scenario 1. For this reason, the 
explanation for the higher discount rate in the functional tomato paste under Scenario 2 
could be that it offers less of an improvement (i.e. health benefits and flavour) in 
comparison to the conventional tomato paste. 
Table 3.3.  Scenario 2: 70/30 Original Market Share 
 
Under Scenario 2, the base utility of the functional tomato paste is increased by 
1% from 3.6428 to 3.6792, holding everything else equal in Situation 11. The resulting 
market shares are 22.4% for the functional tomato paste (
F
S ), 56.4% for the 
conventional (
A
S ) and 21.1% for the substitute (
S
S ). Next, the same procedure was 
followed to increase the base utility of the functional tomato paste by 5%. This increased 
the market share of the functional tomato paste to 72.1%, the conventional tomato paste 
to 26.4% and the substitute tomato paste to 1.5% (Situation 12 in Scenario 2). Also, the 
solution was found for the base utility of the functional tomato paste that yields a zero 
market share (Situation 13 in Scenario 2). This was found to be 3.6135, which is a 0.8% 
decline from the base scenario. Overall, from these changes in utility and the 
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corresponding changes in market share, it is evident under this second scenario the 
market share is more sensitive to changes in base utility of the functional tomato paste 
than in the first scenario. 
Next the sensitivity to price change was tested in the model. The original price of 
the functional tomato paste in the base solution to gain a 10% market share was a 50% 
premium to the conventional tomato paste. Recall that the premium under the first 
scenario was 71%. Therefore, for sensitivity purposes the premium was reduced to 40%, 
rather than 50% which was used in the first scenario. Holding all other variables constant, 
the reduction in price from $0.94/100ml to $0.89/100ml causes the market share of the 
functional tomato paste to increase from 10% to 29.1% (Situation 14 in Scenario 2). The 
market shares of the other two goods fall. The conventional tomato paste falls from 
63.9% to 52.4% and the substitute food falls from 26.1% to 18.5%. The price that causes 
a zero market share for the functional tomato paste is $0.97/100ml which is a 3.2% 
increase in price from the base situation where the functional tomato paste has a 10% 
market share (Situation 15 in Scenario 2). Under this situation the conventional and 
substitute goods revert to the same situation they had in the two-good market. The 
conventional tomato paste had a 70% market share and the substitute 30%. In the first 
scenario the increase in price that caused the market share to become zero was 4.6%. 
These shocks show that under the second scenario, the functional tomato paste is much 
more sensitive to price shocks than in the first scenario. Intuitively, this makes sense 
because of the initial market share of the conventional tomato paste. It is evident by the 
relatively high market share of 70%, that the consumers had a strong preference for that 
tomato paste prior to the introduction of the functional tomato paste. For this reason, 
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consumers will shift back to consuming the conventional tomato paste from the 
functional tomato paste more easily as a result of a price increase than they would under 
Scenario 1. 
Finally, the value of µ was shocked to show the effects on the shares of the three 
goods. Once again, similar to the first scenario a different base was used for the changes 
in µ because virtually no change is possible under the original base situation. The base 
used in this case is Situation 11 in Scenario 2 where the base utility of the functional 
tomato paste is increased by 1%. The first shock is to increase the value of µ to 0.1 from 
0.02 (Situation 16 in Scenario 2). This causes the reduction in market share of the 
functional tomato paste to 2.5% from 22.4%. The market shares of the other two goods 
increase to 68.3% from 56.4% and 29.2% from 21.1% for the conventional and substitute 
tomato paste respectively. The next shock introduced was a change in the value of µ from 
0.02 to 0 (Situation 17 in Scenario 2). The decrease in the discount increases the market 
share of the functional tomato paste to 25.9% from 22.4%. The decrease in market share 
to the conventional and substitute tomato paste was to 54.7% and 19.5% respectively. 
Finally the discount value that caused the market share of the functional tomato paste to 
become zero was calculated (Situation 18 in Scenario 2). The solution was a value of µ of 
0.11. At this value, the market shares of the other two goods returned to the two product 
market values of 70% for the conventional tomato paste and 30% for the substitute. 
Because the discount parameter for the conventional tomato paste is lower under 
Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1, the market share of the functional tomato paste is more 
sensitive to changes in the value of µ. 
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Overall, under scenario 2 the market share of the GM functional food was more 
responsive to changes than it was in scenario 1. Small shocks in the value consumers 
place on the brand, the price of the good and the discount parameter could have a large 
effect on the market share and corresponding profitability of the functional tomato paste. 
The next sub-section provides a summary of the two scenarios. 
 
3.4.3  Summary of simulations  
Although the conclusions that can be drawn from the simulation analysis are 
limited as a result of the number of hypothetical values used and the simplicity of the 
model, there are some generalizations that can be made. First, the sensitivity of the 
products in the real world probably would be less exaggerated than was shown in this 
model. However, the relative sensitivities would be similar. It is valuable to see that if the 
market is divided equally between the original participants, there is much less sensitivity 
than when the participant introducing the GM functional food has a relatively high 
market share. If the firm introducing the GM functional food has a high market share in 
the two good market, they may want to consider that the risk is higher in this case. 
These results can be tied to the work by Cabral (2000). In Scenario 2, the national 
brand firm has the larger market share. We can assume that they are the firm with the 
highest reputation, through the higher base utility relative to the substitute. Also, the firm 
would have a higher base utility relative to a new entrant. It a new entrant entered the 
market, the GM functional food would have to have a lower price and lower discount 
factor in order to compensate for the lower base utility.  
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 A national brand will find it in their best interest to expand their brand to 
include the functional tomato paste if that tomato paste provides what consumers will 
perceive to be a high value health benefit. If there is a high value health benefit, the 
reputation that the brand has will support the initial reputation of the functional food in 
the market. This is because a small increase in the base utility or decrease in the discount 
parameter of the functional tomato paste will have a large beneficial effect on the market 
share of the national brand firm as a whole. On the other hand, if the functional tomato 
paste does not offer a substantial health benefit, the downside risk might be too high for 
the firm to justify expanding their brand. 
 
3.5  The access to intellectual property problem 
Finally, an assessment of the access to intellectual property is warranted. The 
members of the supply chain for GM functional foods will be concerned with the 
transaction costs involved in acquiring licenses necessary to gain access to intellectual 
property held by other firms. The firms that own the intellectual property could either be 
another lifescience firm, who is a competitor, or an upstream biotech firm. As the 
literature in Chapter 2 explained, in order to gain access to intellectual property firms will 
either merge with or acquire the owner of the intellectual property, or they will negotiate 
a license for its use. Either way, the result of having to gain access to the intellectual 
property can be shown as a shift in the marginal cost. In Figure 3.8, this is shown as a 
shift in the marginal cost from MCb to MCb in the lifescience market. This is as a result 
of the extra cost the lifescience firm incurs because of increased transaction costs to 
negotiate a license with a food manufacturer combined with the actual cost of the 
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license.17 The result of this is that the profit maximizing level of output for the lifescience 
firm decreases from q1 to q1.  
The monopsonist food manufacturer also sees a change in their optimal output. 
The increase in marginal cost of the lifescience firm is passed up the supply chain which 
is shown as a shift in marginal cost from MCm to MCm in the food manufacturing firm. 
This also shifts the marginal expenditure of the food manufacturing firm from MEn to 
MEn. As a result, the food manufacturer will want to reduce output from q2 to q2. Once 
again the parties will bargain over the distribution of rent by setting price and quantity. 
However, the rent available for negotiation is smaller in this case as a result of the 
increased transaction costs.  
                                                        
17 The license fee itself will either be a one-time payment for use, or a royalty on sales of the product after 
development. It will be assumed for this analysis that they would have similar effects on the marginal cost. 
The one-time payment will increase the marginal cost because of the debt that has to be serviced and the 
royalty will have to be paid on every unit sold, which will increase the marginal cost. 
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Figure 3.8.  The supply chain with increased transaction costs 
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Figure 3.8 shows the supply chain situation, but to get a better notion of the 
change in rents available as a result of the increase in costs, the food manufacturers 
graph will be examined separately. Figure 3.9 shows this situation. As a result of the 
increase in transaction costs, the shift in marginal cost to the lifescience firm is passed 
along to the food manufacturer. This is shown in Figure 3.9 as a shift from MCm to 
MCm. As a result of this shift, the marginal expenditure of the lifescience firm shifts 
from MEn to MEn. This increase in transaction costs also causes an increase in the 
average cost that the food manufacturer faces from ACm to ACm.  
 
Figure 3.9.  The change in rents resulting from an increase in transaction costs 
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As a result of the shift in marginal costs, the optimal quantities for both the 
monopolist lifescience firm and the monopsonist food manufacturer decreases. The 
available rents to be distributed throughout the supply chain decrease as a result of the 
shift in marginal cost. The new optimal rent to be distributed through the supply chain for 
the monopoly lifescience firm is area pmjig, which is smaller than the original monopoly 
rents equal to area pmade. The food manufacturer will want to bargain towards the 
monopsony solution, in which the new rent becomes area pnklh which is also smaller 
than the original monopsony rent equal to area pnbcf. To distinguish between the two 
areas they have been shaded differently. The situation resulting from the increase in 
marginal cost is in solid grey on top of the original situation, which is a lighter and 
patterned grey. The end solution in terms of the available rents, prices and quantities will 
depend on the relative bargaining power of the monopoly lifescience firm and the 
monopsony food manufacturing firm. 
These increases in marginal costs mean that the size of the rents to negotiate over 
will be smaller. The rents are necessary to pay for the research and development costs 
that the lifescience firm must endure to bring the product to market. They must also cover 
the costs of developing a new product for the food manufacturing firm. If the transaction 
costs involved in attaining licenses increase it could lead to the development of GM 
functional foods becoming infeasible. Another important consideration is the consumer 
demand as shown in Section 3.3. Any small decrease in demand could cause a large 
change in the rents available for distribution throughout the supply chain.  
The actual cost of the license is also important to consider. This cost would not 
likely affect the marginal cost, but instead would be a fixed cost to the lifescience firm. 
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This would increase the average total costs. Although the figures in this chapter do not 
explicitly model these license costs, they are also important to consider. If the cost of the 
license(s) in addition to the other research and development costs become higher than the 
rent distributed to the lifescience firm, the GM functional food research will become 
unfeasible. 
There could be additional problems to consider besides the increase in marginal 
costs as a result of an increased number of negotiations for licenses. There could be a 
case of multiple bilateral monopoly negotiations. Recall that a single bilateral monopoly 
reduces the amount of rent to be distributed from the optimal amount (Williamson, 1971). 
If this level of rent is further reduced from the optimal amount with every additional 
bilateral monopoly negotiation, the rent available for distribution could become too small 
to cover the fixed costs of purchasing the license(s) and research and development costs. 
The rent distribution with multiple bilateral monopoly negotiations could be an additional 
obstacle to the commercial development of GM functional foods. The rent must be 
distributed to cover fixed costs, and the market must cover marginal costs in order for 
there to be incentives for investment at any level of the supply chain for GM functional 
foods. 
  
3.6  Summary  
This chapter provides an in depth analysis of the three challenges that could cause 
a set back to the commercialization of GM functional foods. First, the vertical market is 
overviewed, and the challenges of a bilateral monopoly explained. It is not possible to 
determine a solution for rent distribution exactly because it depends on the relative 
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bargaining strength of the parties involved. If another monopoly were added to this model 
in the form of an owner of intellectual property, it would further complicate the problem. 
Realistically, there are multiple owners of intellectual property, and each negotiation is a 
bilateral monopoly meaning determining a solution is difficult.The analysis shows that 
there are a number of price and quantity combinations possible, as well as rent that must 
be distributed between the lifescience and food manufacturing firms through bargaining.   
Next, the first of the three factors delaying commercialization is discussed. The 
effect of government uncertainty on the expected profits of the lifescience firm is 
modelled. Considering the fact that in Canada, there are no formal functional food 
regulations in place, a firm deciding to invest into research and development will assess 
the current regulatory framework, and proposed regulatory changes in the future. Since 
the firm (lifescience, food manufacturer or both) developing the GM functional food will 
not seek regulatory approval for close to a decade, the firm will respond to uncertainty 
and adjust the expected probability success accordingly. The probability of success, when 
multiplied by the projected profits will give the firm an idea of the expected profits from 
an innovation. As the uncertainty increases the probability of success decreases, which 
lowers expected profits. The firm might then choose to invest in less risky areas causing a 
set back in the development and commercialization of GM functional foods. 
The heterogeneous consumer model shows how the brand image, price and 
efficacy of the functional food will affect its demand. The key to success in this market is 
to provide a highly demanded functional characteristic that satisfies the health benefit it 
promises. It is also important to balance the brand image with price. If the premium for 
the GM functional food is too high, it will lose market share. If bad press surfaces or 
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consumer groups strike back against the brand as a whole, the firm could be a lot worse 
off in terms of market share than if they had not introduced the new functional food.  
Following up on the heterogeneous consumer model in Section 3.3, simulation 
analysis is performed. The model shows the effect of changes in the base utility, price 
and discount parameter of GM functional tomato paste on the market shares of the 
functional tomato paste, the conventional tomato paste under the same national brand and 
the substitute under the stores own-brand. Two scenarios are used to form a base 
scenario from which the shocks are introduced to the system. The first scenario starts 
with each firm holding a 50% market share prior to the introduction of the GM functional 
tomato paste, while in the second scenario the national branded conventional tomato 
paste starts with a 70% market share and the substitute has 30%. In each case a base 
situation is set up with the GM functional food holding a 10% market share. While both 
scenarios prove to be sensitive to all shocks introduced, the second scenario is relatively 
more sensitive. This could be viewed as the level of risk in each scenario. If firms start 
out with the second scenario they will want to include more risk into their projections for 
market share and profitability. 
The final section discusses the transaction cost issues relating to gaining access to 
intellectual property. It begins with the situation shown in Figure 3.1 and shows the effect 
that an increase in the information, negotiation and monitoring costs can have on the 
amount of rents available for distribution in the supply chain. It shows that if the increase 
in transaction costs causes a shift up in the marginal and average costs, the amount of rent 
available decreases. This concerns the lifescience firm because they have to pay for their 
research, development and licensing costs through the rent that they receive. It also 
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concerns the food manufacturer because they must pay for any facility upgrades and 
product development that is necessary to commercialize the functional food. 
The sections can be informally tied together to intuitively explain the true 
challenge to the commercialization of GM functional foods. The simulation analysis 
shows the sensitivity of market share caused by shocks to the base utility, price and 
discount parameter from the model developed in Section 3.3. If the government 
uncertainty model is considered in unison with this model, the expected market share 
would be equal to the market share calculated in the model multiplied by the probability 
of success. This means the market share becomes smaller. As the regulatory uncertainty 
increases, the probability of success and in turn the expected market share decreases.  
The expected market share is directly correlated to demand.18 Changes to the 
demand will have a direct impact on the rent to be distributed through the supply chain. If 
the marginal cost increases because of high transaction costs, it causes a decrease in the 
available rent. If this is combined with a drop in expected market share, the rent could 
become small enough that the lifescience firm and the food manufacturer do not cover 
their research and development costs. This would make investment into the 
commercialization of the GM functional food infeasible.   
The next chapter develops three cases that will explain practical examples of 
success and failure with food innovations. While there are no GM functional foods to 
examine, the case studies assessed give similar experiences from which lessons can be 
learned. The case studies attempt to analyse the situations with respect to supply chain 
relationships, and how the supply chains functioned or failed.      
                                                        
18 The demand for the GM functional food would be equal to the total demand for the products in the 
market multiplied by the market share of the GM functional food. 
 94
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
AN EXAMINATION OF THREE CASES 
 
 
4.1  Introduction  
At the present time, there are no commercially available GM functional foods to 
examine in order to study the issues affecting the industry. For this reason, case studies of 
alternative products are used to learn lessons from past experiences from which useful 
inferences can be made. Three cases are examined. The first is a GM tomato product that 
was made into puree and sold in the UK. Next, a GM potato product is examined. Finally, 
Nexera canola is studied. Nexera is a conventionally-bred Canadian variety with 
functional traits. Links between these cases and the problems delaying the commercial 
introduction of GM functional foods are drawn. 
 
4.2  The case of GM Californian Tomatoes  
An interesting case to examine in order to learn from past experience is the GM 
tomato. The first GM food on the market was the Flavr Savr Tomato, which was 
introduced by the firm Calgene on May 21, 1994 (Bruening and Lyons, 2000). Calgene 
was later purchased by Monsanto. This tomato was aimed at the fresh produce market. It 
was modified using transgenics, so that the softening of the outer cell walls was delayed, 
leading to a delayed ripening of the tomato. The results were two-fold: first, the tomatoes 
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could be picked at a riper stage, meaning more flavour and elimination of the use of 
ethylene to induce ripening. Second, the tomatoes looked riper on the store shelf and had 
a longer lifespan after purchase. 
 Following the introduction of the Flavr Savr tomato, Zeneca, a Swiss-based firm 
whose agribusiness operation merged with the agribusiness operation of Novartis in 2000 
to form Syngenta, introduced a GM tomato to California tomato growers in February, 
1996 (NCBE, 2005a). The main difference between this tomato and the Flavr Savr 
tomato was that the Zeneca version was designed primarily to be processed into tomato 
puree, destined for markets in the UK. A Zeneca  University of Nottingham 
collaboration identified the polygalacturanase gene (pTOM6) responsible for the 
structure of the cell wall during ripening. However, this is the same process that was 
patented by Calgene for the Flavr Savr tomato. The two firms agreed that because they 
were focused on different end-uses, they could split the market. Calgene would continue 
to focus on fresh tomatoes, while Zeneca would participate in the processed market 
(Harvey, 1999).  
 The delayed-ripening technology proved to be well-suited to the production of 
processed tomatoes. The GM tomatoes produced a processed tomato product with 
improved flavour and high viscosity (Harvey, 1999). This is in contrast to the majority of 
GM products introduced to date, that have no direct consumption benefit to the 
consumer. Research also focused on boosting the level of lycopene (a functional food 
component) present in the tomatoes. However, this was not part of the final 
commercialized product. It was a difficult balance to enhance the levels of lycopene 
while keeping it bio-available to consumers, so that their bodies could absorb the 
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functional nutrients. Also, volunteers involved in taste-testing were asked to eat a whole 
can of lycopene-enhanced puree, which was not a positive experience. The volunteers 
preferred lycopene-enhanced paste that was cooked similar to pizza or pasta sauces 
(Harvey, 1999). 
 The tomato puree was a test product for Zeneca. Zeneca was going to monitor the 
success of the tomato puree to make decisions on producing future tomato products such 
as ketchup. Several retailers were approached with offers to sell GM tomato puree 
(Combes, 2005). Safeway and Sainsburys took the offer from Zeneca and marketed the 
puree under their respective private labels. Private labels comprise 75% of shelf space in 
UK retailers. The puree was boldly labelled as made with genetically modified 
tomatoes on the front of the label (NCBE, 2005).  
The supply chain was organised similar to conventional tomato puree. The GM 
tomatoes were segregated for specific use for the two private label GM tomato purees. 
Zeneca sold the seed to the growers. Because the GM tomato puree was a test product, 
Zeneca was more concerned in observing consumer reaction than making a profit. The 
main efficiency gain for the GM tomato puree occurred because the normal loss of 40% 
of the tomato juice did not occur during transportation. This gain was realized by the 
growers and processor, and was partially passed to the consumer in the form of a lower 
price. The retailer made the same margin on the GM tomato puree as they did on other 
tomato purees (Combes, 2005). This coordination between Zeneca, the processor Hunt 
Weston and Sainsburys/Safeway was cited as an efficient supply chain (Chiesa and 
Toletti, 2004; Harvey, 1999). This relationship worked smoothly, even though the level 
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of vertical coordination in the form of monitoring by Safeway and Sainsburys was 
higher than Hunt Weston was accustomed to. 
The marketing strategy used for the GM tomato puree was successful. The day of 
the introduction of the GM tomato puree, positive news coverage reached 22 million 
British viewers. Because it was a test product, GM tomato puree was not sold in all 
Safeway and Sainsburys locations. Target markets included locations with TV stations 
and locations close to universities. Students were targeted because the packaging of the 
GM tomato puree was relatively convenient for students (Combes, 2005). By the end of 
1997, Safeway reported selling 750,000 cans, while Sainsburys had sold over 1 million 
cans (Soil Association, 2003; Combes, 1997 cited in Harvey, 1999). At this time, the GM 
tomato puree was outselling conventional puree when they were competing in the same 
store. The two were always sold together in the retail environment for ease of comparison 
for the consumer. Another factor that contributed to the success of the GM tomato puree 
was the price advantage. The GM product carried the same retail price, but the package 
was 20% larger. 
 Opposition to biotechnology has existed almost as long as scientists have been 
doing research using its methods. This opposition was the reason that Zeneca sought 
multiple retailers with which to coordinate. Multiple firms allowed for cooperation and 
spread the risk to Zeneca. The Institute of Grocery Distribution19, also got involved to 
make sure that there was consistency in the labelling of the goods (Harvey, 1999).  
                                                        
19 The Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD) is a charitable organisation based in England and Wales that 
is funded through activities (conferences, commissioned publications, briefings, etc.) of IGD Services Ltd. 
It provides services to all levels of the food supply chain. The Board of Trustees is composed of executives 
from several European food manufacturers. 
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With a smoothly operating supply chain, and strong demand from consumers one 
would expect that this would be a success story. However, the product was removed from 
store shelves by the end of 1999. This was partially as a result of competing retailers, 
specifically Marks and Spencer, making public statements regarding the removal of GM 
foods from their private labelled product offering (NCBE, 2005b). It was also stated that 
the demand for the tomato puree had begun to subside following a research study by 
Arpad Pusztai, which appeared to show negative health effects of consuming GM foods 
on rats (NCBE, 2005b). However, another contributing factor to less sales of the GM 
tomato puree was that supplies had been exhausted from high demand. This meant that 
the GM tomato puree was not available to consumers anymore (Combes, 2005). 
 
4.2.1  Links between the GM Californian Tomato Puree and theory  
In order for the GM tomato puree to succeed in the long run in the UK it would 
have to be grown in the EU. The transportation costs involved in shipping tomato puree 
from California were relatively high. Most tomatoes in the UK are imported from Spain 
and Italy. Regulatory approval for growth of the GM tomatoes in these countries was 
initially delayed and finally refused. This was a factor in the failure of the GM tomato 
puree (Combes, 2005). Not only did the regulatory uncertainty limit the expected profit, 
but the actual profit from the GM tomato puree was reduced because of increase 
transportation costs involved in shipping the tomato paste from California. 
The fact that this product was a success prior to its removal confirms that the 
success of a single product is not necessarily sufficient for it to remain on the market. The 
removal of the GM Californian Tomato Puree from Safeway and Sainsbury store shelves 
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allowed the firms to make the claim that their private labelled products were GM-free. 
This case shows that brand equity is an important consideration. Even though the product 
was initially successful, the value of keeping the product was less than the value to the 
retailers brand equity of making a GM-free claim. With sustained production, the 
demand for the GM tomato puree could have stayed high. However, the overall market 
share or profits of the grocery retailers supplying the GM tomato puree might have fallen 
as a result of not being able to make the competitive claim that their private label 
products were GM-free. 
It is difficult to link intellectual property issues to this case. The Zeneca tomato 
was able to avoid licensing costs from Calgene because of an agreement to target 
different markets. Also, there was only one key gene (pTOM6) compared to a GM 
functional food which could have several. 
This product had improved quality and a lower price, and still failed. GM 
functional foods will likely be sold at a premium because of additional supply chain 
costs, such as the cost of increased identity preservation and transaction costs involved in 
gaining access to intellectual property. If a product with a large price discount cannot 
succeed, it suggests that a GM product sold at a premium could also fail.  
  
4.3  The case of the NatureMark NewLeaf Potato  
In 1995 a potato seed company called NatureMark, which was a subsidiary of 
Monsanto, introduced a transgenic potato in Canada and the US that enabled producers to 
use fewer applications of pesticides. Pesticide use is necessary in potato production to 
protect against a variety of pests including weeds, insects and disease. Potato production 
 100
 
is high-risk and production costs normally exceed $1000(US)/acre. The onset of a pest 
infestation can double or triple the production costs (Thorton, 2003). 
The potato was viewed as an ideal candidate to be altered using biotechnology, 
because traditional breeding is especially time consuming in potatoes (Thorton, 2003). 
The first NewLeaf potato contained a gene inserted in the potato so that it exhibited 
resistance to the Colorado potato beetle. This was followed a couple years later by 
inserting a different gene that made the potato resistant to the potato leafroll virus 
(Thomas et al., 1997). The combination of these two pests accounted for 80% of the 
pesticide applications made by potato growers in the US (Thorton, 2003). Overall, three 
types of NewLeaf potatoes were introduced: NL10 was resistant to the Colorado potato 
beetle, NL20 was resistant to the Colorado potato beetle, and the potato virus Y and 
NL30 was resistant to the Colorado potato beetle and the potato leafroll virus. All of 
these varieties were fully approved in Canada and the US (NatureMark Potatoes, 2002).  
Four varieties of potatoes were chosen to insert the NewLeaf genes into. The 
NL10 type was available in Russet Burbank, Atlantic and Superior varieties. The NL20 
was available in the Russet Burbank and Shepody varieties, and the NL30 was available 
in the Russet Burbank variety (NatureMark Potatoes, 2002). These varieties had different 
uses depending on the variety. The Russet Burbank and Shepody are used for processing 
potato chips. The Atlantic and Superior varieties are marketed to the potato chip 
processors, while all four varieties can also be sold fresh for boiling (CFIA, 2005). 
 Coffin (2005) stated that viral resistance in the NewLeaf potatoes was especially 
important in Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.), where the incidence of infection was high. In 
field trials performed throughout the lifespan of the product, the NewLeaf varieties were 
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exposed to high levels of viral infections along-side conventional Russet Burbank 
potatoes. The Russet Burbank potatoes showed up to a 100% infection rate, while 
researchers could not find signs of infection in the NewLeaf varieties. 
Growers contracted their production to two main processors in Canada, McCain 
Foods Ltd. and Cavendish Farms. In the US, the potatoes were also contracted to J.R. 
Simplot Company. The NewLeaf potatoes were not segregated in the supply chain. The 
main factor of concern to processors was the variety (i.e. Russet Burbank, Atlantic, 
Shepody, and Superior). The NewLeaf potatoes were not segregated, so it was not 
possible to sell processed potatoes as GM-free. Major buyers from these two processors 
were McDonalds and Burger King. Other major buyers of processing potatoes are 
Proctor and Gamble who make Pringles and PepsiCo Inc. who make Frito-Lay potato 
chips. A specific set of supply chain relationships arose for those potatoes. 
 
4.3.1  The supply chain structure 
Monsanto was the furthest upstream member of the supply chain, operating 
NatureMark as a unit devoted to potato breeding within Monsanto. In contrast to other 
types of agricultural supply chains, there are no seed companies in the potato industry. 
Monsanto dealt with this problem by searching the potato-growing regions and finding 
successful commercial potato growers to supply seed potatoes. Monsanto contacted these 
growers, and designated them as authorized to grow NewLeaf potatoes to sell as seed 
(Stark, 2005). 
The seed growers grew the seed and sold it to other commercial potato growers. 
The commercial potato growers were required to sign licenses in order to purchase the 
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seed from the authorized seed grower. This license was in the form of a technology use 
agreement (TUA), similar to other GM crops that Monsanto sells.20 Once the TUA was 
signed, the seed grower would send it to Monsanto. Monsanto would then invoice the 
commercial grower for a fee required to use the GM technology (Stark, 2005). 
 From that point on, the supply chain operated in basically the same manner as a 
conventional Russet Burbank potato. The grower is coordinated with the food processor. 
The contract specifies the price, variety and delivery date(s). The price of potatoes is 
negotiated at the time of contracting. Price is flexible and dependent on the applicable 
costs of production that the growers face (Coffin, 2005). 
The processor then contracts to sell the processed potatoes to several different 
outlets. Cavendish Farms sells French fries to three groups of customers: (1) quick 
service restaurants (Burger King, Wendys and Kentucky Fried Chicken), (2) grocery 
stores, and (3) food service firms in hospitals and schools (Coffin, 2005).  
The potato processors in North America are highly competitive because there is a 
large amount of over-capacity in the industry. For this reason, if a processor wishes to 
become a supplier for a customer, they are in a difficult bargaining position. When this 
fact is combined with the negotiation to determine prices with growers, the processor is 
usually faced with a low processing margin. 
There was an agreement between Monsanto and Cavendish Farms that was 
unique to these two parties (the other potato processors were not involved). Cavendish 
Farms has a fertilizer division that works with growers on agronomic issues. Monsanto 
                                                        
20 The TUA is an agreement by the grower that they will sell all the production that they grow from the 
seed, and not use any for re-seeding (Stark, 2005). 
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arranged a service agreement with the fertilizer division to provide technical support to 
growers of NewLeaf potatoes. 
Cavendish Farms, which processes potatoes into French fries, was a major buyer 
of NewLeaf potatoes in Canada. Of the small amount of NewLeaf contracted in P.E.I, 
Cavendish farms had 7,000 acres contracted at the peak of production (Coffin, 2005). 
This was approximately 6% of total potato production in P.E.I. which was 113,000 acres 
in 1999 (CHASS, 2005a). The NewLeaf potato was a product that Cavendish Farms was 
impressed with because of the effect it had on the quality of potatoes, due to the decrease 
in viral infection. It was also a product that, if adopted at a higher rate, would have led to 
more certainty in the production level of potatoes as a result of not being vulnerable to 
disease outbreaks. 
In 1996, the acreage of NewLeaf Potatoes was 10,000 acres in the US, which 
increased to 50,000 acres by 1999 (Killman, 2000). This was still a relatively small 
proportion compared to the overall acreage of 1.3 million acres potatoes planted annually 
in the US.  This small percentage is somewhat surprising given that Gianessi et al. (2002) 
calculated that if producers in Idaho, Oregon and Washington had planted the NewLeaf 
potato with Colorado potato beetle and potato virus in the 2001 season they could have 
benefited by $58 million and avoided spraying 1.45 million pounds of pesticide on 
621,000 acres. 
One of the main problems with the NewLeaf potatoes stemmed from the fact that 
there was no strategy in place for segregation. This meant that if a customer of one of the 
processors wished to purchase non-GM potatoes, the processor could not comply unless 
it only dealt with producers who did not grow NewLeaf Varieties. There was no financial 
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incentive for the processors to put resources into methods of determining whether or not 
potatoes were GM (Thorton, 2003). This was because there was no easy method to 
determine whether a potato contained GM DNA. An Elisa test is one method used to 
analyse proteins in a substance to determine the existence of GM DNA, but it is both 
costly and time consuming. Random tests conducted by the New Brunswick provincial 
government in conjunction with McCain Foods, showed that there were potatoes 
delivered that were supposed to be non-GM that contained the GM DNA. The conclusion 
was that growers were mixing the varieties together (Coffin, 2005). Given that there was 
no requirement to segregate, there was no real violation. If the Elisa test was not 
performed, there would have been no way to determine that the potatoes were different. 
Cavendish Farms was an exception, because in their contracts with growers they 
specified the variety grown. They had the capability to call for delivery of GM potatoes at 
separate delivery times, but generally did not (Coffin, 2005).  
 
4.3.2  The end of commercialization  
Major changes started to occur in 1999 when McDonalds Corporation, reacting 
to increasingly negative consumer sentiment towards GM foods, instructed its suppliers 
to quit using GM potatoes (Killman, 2000). In reaction to McDonalds decision, Burger 
King, Wendys, Proctor and Gamble (Pringles) and PepsiCo (Frito-Lay) were quick to 
follow with similar directives to their suppliers. The processors reacted to this news by 
instructing producers to stop growing the GM potatoes. As a result of the processors 
refusal to process GM potatoes, Monsanto had little choice but to stop selling the 
NatureMark NewLeaf Potatoes in 2001 (Thorton, 2003).          
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 This case shows that in order to protect their brand image, firms like McDonalds 
forced their suppliers to process only non-GM potatoes, so that they could state they were 
GM-free. Once McDonalds made the claim, then competitors followed to avoid losing 
market share over the issue. The aggregate benefits of the NewLeaf potato were relatively 
minor. This is because the proportion of total potato production devoted to the NewLeaf 
potato was small. The potential benefits would have possibly been larger had the 
NewLeaf potato been adopted at a higher rate. The improved quality and more consistent 
yield were advantages that led to gains to the individual grower, and in turn the 
processor. However, the likely reason that firms such as McDonalds instructed suppliers 
to stop purchasing NewLeaf varieties was that the benefits passed to them were not high 
enough to justify taking the image risks associated with selling GM foods.   
Potato producers did not adopt the technology very quickly; the maximum 
adoption rate in the US was just under 4%, while in P.E.I. it was 5%. Contrast this to 
soybeans in the US, which were grown under limited quantities in 1996, expanded to 
17% of acreage in 1997, 56% by 1999 and 68% by 2001 (Fernandez-Cornejo and 
McBride, 2002). Although the adoption rate of NewLeaf potatoes was fast compared to 
other previous new potato varieties (Thorton, 2003), it was very slow compared to GM 
soybeans. There were a couple of potential factors that contributed to this issue. First, the 
TUA that the growers signed required them to plant varieties non-resistant to insects as 
buffers around areas where resistant varieties were planted. This was an attempt to reduce 
the growth of resistant insects. Second, a new pesticide called Imidacloprid (Admire 
brand by Bayer) was introduced at the same time as the NewLeaf potato (Stark, 2005). 
This pesticide offered producers an effective option against the Colorado potato beetle 
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relative to past pesticides (Thorton, 2003). However, a third explanation could be that the 
costs associated with gaining access to the technology were high enough that there was 
little incentive to switch. Unlike for soybeans, Monsanto had fewer acres to recoup the 
large costs associated with developing a new plant. Also, it takes years to build up the 
seed-stock of potatoes to a level where significant acres can be seeded (Thorton, 2003).  
The fact that the NewLeaf potato was not on the market long enough to allow for 
more complete adoption meant that the percentage of US potato production devoted to 
NewLeaf potatoes was small. As a result, the increase in supply from adoption of the 
NewLeaf varieties was not high enough to cause a reduction in the price of potatoes. 
However, the potato processors were optimistic about the future potential of the NewLeaf 
varieties. With a higher adoption rate of the NewLeaf varieties, the level of certainty with 
respect to quality21, price and supply in the market could potentially have been higher. 
This increased certainty would have led to more economic benefits to be passed down the 
supply chain. With the low adoption rate, the benefits to be passed along the supply chain 
were small.  
If the NewLeaf potatoes were adopted at a higher rate, the processors would have 
passed the higher quality of the NewLeaf potato through to their customers in the form of 
higher quality French fries and potato chips. However, at the adoption rate that existed, 
the potential quality improvements must not have been high enough to compensate for 
the increased brand risk. For this reason, McDonalds demanded the processors they dealt 
with sell them only non-GM potatoes. Their competitors and other large buyers of 
processed potatoes followed. 
                                                        
21 The quality of the NewLeaf varieties with viral resistance was higher in areas where there was disease 
problems, because they showed no signs of the disease (Coffin, 2005). 
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The NewLeaf potato was a part of a broad product offering by Monsanto at the 
time. There was a problem with the NewLeaf potato because it required a completely 
separate agronomic support system and staff than what was used by crops like corn and 
soybeans. This lack of synergy meant that there were a lot of costs involved with 
providing the necessary service for growers of NewLeaf potatoes. Initially Monsanto 
entertained offers to sell the NatureMark unit, but did not receive any offers that they 
thought justified selling it. Monsanto then decided to make NatureMark inactive, but 
have not dismissed the possibility of reintroducing it in the future (Stark, 2005). 
The reaction to the NewLeaf potato has had a lasting effect on the parties 
involved. Monsanto is now starting to recognize that the reaction of the grocery stores 
and restaurants must be considered. They recognize that consumers identify what they 
want through the brands they consume (Stark, 2005). The processors are also concerned 
with the effect that the introduction of a new product will have on their brand image 
(Coffin, 2005). 
The key supply chain issue with regards to the NewLeaf potato was the lack of 
segregation of GM from non-GM potatoes. The processors decided to call for an end to 
the production of the NewLeaf potato rather than segregation. One of the reasons was 
that the benefits that the potatoes offered may not have been high enough to compensate 
for the extra costs of segregation. As explained earlier, the potato processing industry was 
very competitive. The extra cost of segregation might have been a direct loss to the 
processors because they may have been unable to recover these costs from either the 
growers or their customers.  
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This case offers an example of a product with superior agronomics that also had 
the potential to offer a higher quality end product as a result of a lower incidence of 
disease. However, this potential benefit was not enough to compensate the downstream 
purchasers of the processed potatoes for the risk of consumer backlash as a result of the 
NewLeaf potato being GM.  
This case study could be analysed as a situation similar to the bilateral monopoly 
modelled in chapter four. In this case, the monopoly would be Monsanto. There is not 
monopsony, but the quick service restaurants (i.e. McDonalds and Burger King) could 
be considered an oligopsony. Even though there was no agreement between Monsanto 
and the quick service restaurants, the rents collected by the quick service restaurants 
would be divided throughout the supply chain. After Monsanto collected royalties from 
the sales of NewLeaf seed, the remaining rent may not have been enough to compensate 
the quick service restaurants for the risk they felt they were exposed to by selling GM 
potatoes. For this reason they felt it was in their best interest to purchase only non-GM 
potatoes. 
 
4.3.3 Links from the NewLeaf potato to theory 
There was some regulatory uncertainty that played a role in the removal of the 
NewLeaf potato from the market. Authorities in Japan found that a shipment of potatoes 
carried the virus-resistant gene. This gene had been previously approved as being safe in 
Japan. However, Japan had put a regulation in place that prohibited the shipment of those 
potatoes without communicating this to the exporters. As a result of the new regulation, 
the shipment of potatoes was recalled. Because of the lack of segregation in the supply 
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chain, the continued growing of NewLeaf potatoes would have meant the loss of the 
Japanese market. This was an additional reason for pressure to discontinue growing the 
NewLeaf potatoes (Stark, 2005). 
The NewLeaf potato was not segregated, so it is difficult to draw a direct link 
between the heterogeneous consumer model discussed in chapter 3 and this case. One of 
the potential reasons processed potato buyers such as McDonalds demanded that 
processors sell them non-GM potatoes was that they may have been concerned with 
losing market share in general. This in turn would have had an effect on their brand 
capital.  
In some cases, the NewLeaf potatoes had two key pieces of intellectual property 
(Colorado potato beetle resistance and potato leafroll/potato Y virus resistance). 
However, it does not appear that access to intellectual property was a large problem. The 
only problem could be that there was not enough rent gained through the agronomic 
benefit to compensate Monsanto for its research and development costs, the grower, the 
processors and the processed potato buyers. The hypothesis would be that the processed 
potato buyers did not receive a large enough portion of the rent to compensate them for 
the increased consumer and branding risk resulting from the fact that he potato was GM.   
 
4.4  The case of Nexera Canola  
Nexera canola is a product that was developed by Dow AgroSciences, and is an 
example of a functional food derived from conventional breeding. Nexera canola is used 
to produce Natreon canola oil. In contrast to other vegetable oils, it is naturally stable. 
Therefore it does not require hydrogenation, which means virtually no trans-fats are 
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present. It is also low in saturated fats. The oil has a higher level of oleic and a lower 
level of linoleic acids than conventional canola, which is the reason that the oil is 
naturally stable (Malla et al., 2005). It is estimated that 20,000 deaths per year in the US 
could be attributable to trans-fats (Harvard School of Public Health, 2004, Cited by Dow 
AgroSciences, 2004).  
As a result of these health concerns, the US is introducing new trans-fat labelling 
regulations in 2006. Canada will have similar regulations in place by December 2005 for 
large food manufacturers, and for all food manufacturers by 2007 (Malla et al., 2005). As 
a result, Dow AgroSciences expects demand for Nexera canola to increase. At the present 
time the majority of packaged processed foods contain hydrogenated oils, which lead to 
the formation of trans-fats (Dow AgroSciences, 2003). 
The Nexera case is an interesting one to examine as a benchmark for how the 
supply chain relationships could be expected to develop for GM functional foods. A 
major difference is that Nexera was developed through conventional methods. All of the 
production, transportation and handling and processing occur through an identity 
preserved system. Due to the special traits that this canola exhibits, it cannot be 
commingled with other canola. Canola producers sign an identity preserved production 
contract when they buy their seed, which offers them a premium on a basis contract 
compared to regular canola. At the present time, Louis Dreyfus is offering a $34/tonne 
premium on the November 2005 basis from its Lyalta, Alberta location (Louis Dreyfus 
Ltd., 2005). The contract states a delivery period. The canola crusher is free to choose a 
date within this period to command delivery. The crop is then picked up from the 
producers yard and delivered directly to the crusher. The crusher must clean out the 
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facility and have a specialty crush period where only the Nexera canola is crushed. In 
Canada, the crusher for Nexera canola is Canbra Foods Ltd., a subsidiary of James 
Richardson International located in Lethbridge, Alberta. There are two grain companies 
involved in the formation of contracts with producers, Pioneer Grain Company Ltd. 
(subsidiary of James Richardson International) and Louis Dreyfus Canada Ltd.  
Nexera canola is currently grown in western Canada, where it represented 3.5% of 
acreage in 2002 (Phillips and Smyth, 2003; CHASS, 2005b) and estimated to be 
approximately 5% of canola acreage in 2005 (Zacharias, 2005, cited in Malla et al., 
2005). About half of the Natreon oil processed from Nexera canola is sold to North 
American food service and food manufacturing industries (Malla et al., 2005). 
Interestingly the Nexera brand is not promoted in these locations. Currently no Natreon 
canola oil is sold directly to consumers at the retail level in Canada. The Natreon canola 
oil not sold in North America is sold in Japan (Malla et al., 2005).  
This case shows that although there are extra vertical coordination costs involved 
in this supply chain as a result of the identity preservation, the product appears to be 
successful. The producer is compensated for their extra costs through a price premium. 
Also, other parties in the supply chain must endure extra costs when handling the 
specialty canola, and must be compensated as a result. This must be happening, as 
production of Nexera canola continues currently. 
Also, the supply chain gives an example of a functioning bilateral monopoly. 
Dow AgroSciences is the sole provider of the Nexera Seed, while Canbra Foods Ltd. is 
the only crusher that processes the canola into oil. However, Cargill Limited produces 
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and markets InterMountain Canola which is also trans-fat free (Malla et al., 2005). This 
provides some competition in the supply chain.  
Nexera canola targets an issue (trans-fats) that consumers are increasingly 
concerned about. The fact that regulators are also concerned about the effects of trans-fats 
has led to proposals to institute trans-fat labelling regulations. This is a positive 
regulatory development for those participating in the supply chain for Nexera canola. The 
fact that Nexera is not GM offers it an additional form of differentiation in the market, 
because the majority of canola produced in Canada is GM. For this reason, marketing 
Natreon canola oil does not have the same level of risks as a similar GM product, caused 
by consumer aversion and backlash against the brand. The fact that the benefits of 
Natreon canola are not promoted by the food service and food manufacturers in Canada is 
unusual because of these apparent benefits that the product provides. 
 
4.4.1  Links from Nexera canola to theory 
In the case of Nexera canola the government regulatory environment in North 
America will assist the product in its success in the next couple of years. Canada will 
have trans-fat labelling regulations in place by December 2005, while the US will have 
regulations in place in 2006 (Malla et al., 2005). To avoid labelling food with trans-fat 
labels, food manufacturers will search out oils like Nexera which contain little trans-fat. 
In this case the regulatory uncertainty is reduced because developers have the trans-fat 
labelling regulation as guidance. In contrast to aiming to make a nutritional claim, the 
Nexera/Natreon products avoid having to make a claim. 
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The consumer aversion and brand risk problems discussed in the theory section do 
not necessarily apply to Nexera canola because it is not developed through 
biotechnology. It is interesting that it is not promoted in North America under the 
Natreon brand, even though intuition would lead one to assume that this product would 
have a positive consumer image. A possible explanation could be that it is currently 
produced as a low percentage of total canola production. Natreon canola oil could not 
supply the entire market. If Natreon was promoted as healthy, it might gain market share, 
but the negative effect on the reputation of existing canola oil products could be more 
significant. Currently, consumers might not recognize that the oils are unhealthy. The 
introduction of a healthy alternative like branded Natreon might alert consumers to the 
unhealthy aspects of other canola oils, leading to a lower willingness to pay. This could 
lead to a net loss to the crusher. 
The issues relating to access to intellectual property are not a major concern in 
this supply chain. Because biotechnology is not used in the development of Nexera 
canola, the intellectual property issues involved with biotechnology are not a factor. Also, 
Dow AgroSciences is the owner of the brand name, which eliminates the need to license 
the brand. The absence of these issues may be a contributing factor to the success of 
Nexera canola. 
 
4.5  Summary  
The case of the GM Californian tomato puree shows that food manufacturers and 
retailers will eliminate successful products in order to reduce the chance of consumer 
backlash towards their brand. This reaction to consumer aversion was echoed in the case 
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of the NewLeaf potato. In this case the benefits of higher quality potatoes that were 
exposed to fewer pesticides were not passed to buyers of processed potatoes. Restaurants 
like McDonalds wanted to make the statement that they did not use GM potatoes. This 
too is a significant case because of the long-term potential that the NewLeaf potato had to 
provide a higher quality, more consistent yield of potatoes. The result of more consistent 
yields would be less crop failures and a lower price of potatoes. Eventually, this could 
mean higher profits to the downstream firms. Considering that the buyers of processed 
potatoes have market power, it would be assumed that the profits would eventually be 
received by the firms like McDonalds. Despite this, they made the decision that a GM-
free claim was more valuable to the company.  
Finally, the Nexera canola case shows that a functional food with an identity 
preserved supply chain can be successful. It gives an indication of the possible supply 
chain structure for a GM functional food. However, the value of the case is limited by the 
fact that the problems associated with access to intellectual property do not exist to the 
same degree as can be expected in GM equivalents. Gaining access to intellectual 
property would be an additional cost to the supply chain that would have to be recovered 
by a consumer price premium. 
The next chapter provides a discussion of the key issues examined in this thesis. It 
offers supply chain implications and examines potential products that could be expected 
to be developed as GM functional foods. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
5.1  Introduction  
This chapter uses the literature reviewed in Chapter two, along with theoretical 
modelling performed in Chapter 3 to discuss the implications of the potential problems 
on the development of commercial GM functional foods. It also uses the information 
from the case studies examined in Chapter four that highlight some of the problems and 
positive lessons from past products. Finally, the discussion ties these factors together to 
make inferences regarding the potential structure of the supply chain for GM functional 
foods. 
 
5.2  Implications of the three factors  
Any one of these factors: government regulatory uncertainty, consumer aversion 
and branding risk, or access to intellectual property could cause a set back to the 
commercialization of a product. The fact that all three exist simultaneously in the supply 
chain for GM functional foods means that the potential for delayed commercialization in 
this industry is high. This section discusses the implications of each problem and then ties 
them together. 
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5.2.1  Government regulatory uncertainty  
The first factor that was discussed was the regulatory uncertainty that exists with 
respect to biotechnology and functional foods. Evidence from Chapter two showed that 
this uncertainty has been a major barrier to the introduction of new functional foods. The 
implications of this regulatory uncertainty are shown in Chapter 3. The increased 
uncertainty will cause a decrease in the probability of research and development success 
(α)22. This means that the expected profit of investing in research and development 
decreases. 
The ideal method to increase the value of  α  in this case would be to decrease the 
level of regulatory uncertainty. The firms involved in research and development of GM 
functional foods might find it in their best interest to lobby regulators to develop some 
clearer regulations with respect to the certification and allowable claims in functional 
foods. If there were specific regulations in place, the firms doing research would have a 
better idea of what type of products and claims they would be able to make and the 
requirements that they have in regards to proving a claim is legitimate. 
Policymakers interested in promoting innovation in functional foods could 
contribute by administering regulations that provide clear guidance to industry 
stakeholders. If innovators could follow regulations stating allowable claims, and the 
requirements for approval of new claims, they could develop a research strategy to target 
those claims. Innovation could also be stimulated by introducing a regulatory process for 
approval of new functional foods. This approval process would not only offer innovators 
                                                        
22 Recall that α  ( ]1,0[∈α ) represents the estimated probability of research success in commercial 
development of a GM functional food in the model in section 3.2. As the level of government uncertainty 
increases the value of α  decreases, leading to a lower expected profit. 
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a consistent regulatory method to follow for new introductions, but also some reassurance 
to consumers that these foods are considered safe23.  
At the international level, harmonization of regulations with respect to GM 
functional foods would lead to the highest rate of innovation. However, complete 
harmonization is a challenge because nations desire sovereignty when developing 
regulations, especially in foods. The optimal international regulations for GM functional 
foods would be based on generally accepted scientific studies. For example, if one 
country approved the functional food and its claim, approval in other countries could be 
made based on the scientific evidence from the first country. This would eliminate the 
repetition of scientific tests for regulatory approval in multiple countries. 
 
5.2.2  Consumers and branding  
The next problem that was discussed was consumer aversion to the technology 
and the branding problem. Within the highly concentrated food processing sector, the 
brand equity of the firms is important. When considering the introduction of GM 
functional foods as a part of their product offering, food manufacturers will consider the 
risk to their brand. Following the propositions by Cabral, the choice made by individual 
firms will depend on the current reputation of their firm, combined with the quality of the 
product they plan to introduce. 
Chapter 3 showed that a GM functional food that was valued highly by consumers 
could have a beneficial effect on the firm as a whole. However, a food safety concern or 
recall of the GM functional food could have damaging effects on the brand equity of the 
                                                        
23 The idea that the regulatory procedure can convey food safety to the consumer is mainly a North 
American concept. As was explained earlier in the thesis, many Europeans have a distrust of regulators. 
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firm. Food firms will have to weigh the benefits of introducing a new food with 
functional attributes against the risk that a negative consumer reaction could result in a 
backlash against the firms entire product offering. 
Lifescience firms investing in the research and development of GM functional 
foods should realize this ex ante and plan the products they develop accordingly. Unlike 
crops like soybeans, corn and canola that have been the main successes that the 
lifescience firms have experienced so far, the introduction of GM functional foods will 
require coordination with food processors.  
Lifescience firms have learned that in order to have future success, they need to 
focus on developing products that target demands of food manufacturers and consumers 
(Stark, 2005). They have the ability to research new products with applications in the 
food sector. However, as a result of the time it takes to turn an idea into a commercialized 
product, the lifescience company cannot afford to invest in a fad (Stark, 2005). This is 
one reason why simply considering consumer preferences is not sufficient to predict the 
potential success of a product. The products developed will aim to target problems in a 
method that is sustainable. For example, a growing and constant problem is safe and 
healthy methods of targeting heart disease and obesity. Trendy diets, such as the Atkins 
diet, rise and fall but the core problem still remains. Researchers of GM functional foods 
will look to target these problems with sustainable products that are still able to satisfy 
consumers tastes. It will then be up to the individual food manufacturers to decide 
whether the qualities the GM functional food brings forth are a worthwhile product with 
which to expand their brand.  
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5.2.3  The access to intellectual property problem  
The final problem that was discussed was the potential for added costs while 
gaining access to the intellectual property necessary for the development of GM 
functional foods. The lifescience firm faces these costs while gaining licenses for access 
to the technologies. The necessity to gain access to the technologies means having to find 
information on the pieces of intellectual property that must be licensed and then negotiate 
the terms, conditions and cost of the license with other lifescience firms or basic 
technology providers.  
Currently there are no institutions in place to standardize the exchange of these 
contracts. The contracts are negotiated ex post to initial research on a case-by-case basis. 
In the case of a potential GM functional food for which the developing firm requires 
access to several pieces of intellectual property, the resulting transaction costs could be 
high. In some cases the process could be held up if the firm holding the intellectual 
property wishes to retain exclusive access. In any case, the transaction costs associated 
with the negation process could increase the marginal costs in the supply chain, reducing 
the amount of rent available for distribution.  
The solution to this problem is complicated, as there are a number of possible 
results because of the bilateral monopoly market structure between the upstream 
lifescience firm and the downstream food manufacturer. The solution will depend on the 
relative bargaining strength of the two parties. In order for the food manufacturer to have 
the incentive to invest, they will have to make at least as much from investing in GM 
functional foods as they could from investing into existing products. The lifescience firm 
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will have to cover its costs of research and development as well. Depending on the 
amount of available rents, there might not be a solution to meet these requirements. 
 
5.2.4  Tying the factors together  
If each of the preceding three factors alone appear to be capable of causing a set 
back to the commercialization of GM functional foods, when combined they are a severe 
hindrance. The market share of a product is directly correlated to the demand for that 
product. A change in the demand for a food causes the rent available for distribution 
throughout the supply chain to change accordingly. An increase in the uncertainty 
resulting from regulatory ambiguity, causes the expected demand to decrease. It follows 
that the expected rent for distribution throughout the supply chain to decrease. The food 
manufacturing firm must consider the risk involved with expanding their brand to include 
GM functional foods as a result. Section 3.4 showed the sensitivity to market share as a 
result of changes in the base utility that could be a measure of brand image. This type of 
sensitivity analysis could reveal to a food manufacturer the potential risks and benefits to 
the firm from shocks to the variables and parameters. When this demand risk is 
considered, the expected demand and in turn the expected rent available to distribute 
could decrease. 
The demand challenge is then combined with the supply issues complicated by 
the added costs within the supply chain. When compared to a conventional food, the 
developers of GM functional foods will have to deal with increased transaction costs to 
attain access to intellectual property necessary to develop products. Also, there are 
potential increased coordination costs resulting from the need to have an identity 
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preserved supply chain to maintain the functional attribute in the GM functional food. 
The combination of these factors will have an effect on the marginal cost and in turn the 
amount of rent available for distribution. 
The final factor to keep in mind is that the rent available to both the lifescience 
firm and the food manufacturer must be at least as good as the other opportunities 
available to them. If return from investment elsewhere is higher, there will be little 
investment in the development of GM functional foods.  
Alternatively, the expected returns from investment in GM functional foods could 
be relatively high. The food manufacturers might predict that the introduction of health-
promoting products could boost their brand image. Also, the lifescience firm could own 
the intellectual property necessary to develop the product and therefore face little to no 
cost in acquiring licenses. Finally, the agreement between the lifescience firm and the 
food manufacturer for processing could be simple, similar to the Nexera canola case 
study. In this case the firms involved might see a good opportunity to invest in GM 
functional foods. 
 
5.3  Potential supply chain developments 
This section presents possible supply chain structures that would facilitate 
negotiations between a lifescience firm and a food manufacturer and reduce transaction 
costs and uncertainty. 
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5.3.1  The market for intellectual property  
The furthest upstream transaction in the supply chain for GM functional foods is 
the acquisition of licenses for intellectual property. As was mentioned in chapter two, 
there are no standardized institutions in place to reduce the impediments involved in 
gaining access to intellectual property. As a result, when the amount of intellectual 
property contained in a product increases, the transaction costs involved in gaining access 
to these technologies increases simultaneously. An independent institution such as a 
clearinghouse could offer a database of patented technologies and the owners, and 
provide a standard set of terms, conditions and basis for prices that would reduce the 
transaction costs involved in accessing this intellectual property. 
The clearinghouse could offer those firms willing to sell licenses an opportunity 
to put them on the market. The clearinghouse would then act as an independent mediator 
allowing participants a forum to make agreements. The price would depend on the 
demand for specific pieces of intellectual property. For example, a valuable piece of 
intellectual property necessary for the development of several products would have a 
higher price than intellectual property with a use that is more specific for a single 
product. As was explained in chapter 2, many holders of intellectual property must sell 
licenses in order to generate revenue from them. These firms do not have the expertise to 
develop new seed, so holding exclusive access has no value to them. It is becoming 
common for firms to realize that licensing technology is more profitable than maintaining 
sole access.  
If the patenting of genetic material continues, it could lead to a delay in the 
development of not only GM functional foods, but several other products using this 
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technology. Regulators might want to take the initiative to develop an intellectual 
property clearinghouse in order to address this problem. The clearinghouse might solve 
an institutional failure and lead to a higher rate of innovation of products containing a 
high level of intellectual property. 
Firms holding patents that offer them a greater advantage if they keep sole access 
would simply not offer the intellectual property in the clearinghouse. If sole access is 
maintained for a piece of technology, it would not be available for licensing to other 
firms through the clearinghouse. Firms who know that they are using a piece of 
intellectual property that is not available for licensing on the clearinghouse will then look 
to use alternative methods of producing their product. However, if too many firms decide 
to maintain exclusive access, the amount of valuable intellectual property utilizing the 
clearinghouse could be small. In this case, technologies requiring access to these 
technologies will be held up. 
The intellectual property clearinghouse could help to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with gaining access to intellectual property rights. However, the problem of 
multiple bilateral monopoly negotiations might not be avoided. If the problems associated 
with the distribution of rent exist the supply chain for GM functional foods, it will pose 
an obstacle that is more complicated to solve. 
 
5.3.2  Vertical relationships  
The supply chain for GM functional foods will be more complicated than for the 
majority of agricultural commodities produced. As a result of the functional trait that has 
been modified into the food, the supply chain will have to be set up to segregate the crop 
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from conventional relatives. This identity preserved supply chain will require 
coordination between all levels of the supply chain.  
Furthest upstream, there will be a contract between the lifescience firm 
developing the GM functional food and the owners of intellectual property in the form of 
a license. The license will either be paid for through a lump sum payment, or through 
royalties. If the agreement calls for a lump sum payment, the relationship will include 
little monitoring. However, if the payment is in the form of royalties on each unit of 
production sold, the monitoring of payment, and in turn the level of coordination at this 
level of the supply chain will increase. 
The next downstream level of the supply chain will consist of the relationship 
between the lifescience firm and the producer of the food. However, in this case the food 
manufacturing firm will also be involved in the contracting process. When the grower 
purchases the seed, they will have to sign an agreement to sell the seed to the specified 
food manufacturer within a contracted delivery period. Most likely, the grower will pay a 
premium for the seed. To create incentive for investment into the seed, the grower will 
receive a premium on the price they receive over the conventional equivalent. 
After the grower has purchased the seed, there are several factors that must be 
considered. First, the party responsible for agronomic consulting must be specified. This 
is because the grower will need advice when growing the food, and providing the 
expertise will be a cost to whichever party provides the service. Second, the party 
involved in monitoring quality must be appointed. The grower will be interested in who 
provides the inputs and who to contact with problems. 
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All of the preceding factors are reasons why there will be close coordination 
between the lifescience firm and the food manufacturer. The food manufacturer will be 
concerned with the quality of food produced, including the existence of the functional 
attribute. The two sides will have to determine who will be involved in the monitoring of 
crop quality, as well as who will support the grower for agronomic advice. The two sides 
might also want to provide inputs to the grower as a method of ensuring that the crop is 
grown in an approved manner. Because of these factors, the two sides will have to have a 
relationship that allows for good communication. 
There will likely be coordination between the food manufacturer and the 
lifescience firm from the early stages of the development of the product. This is because 
in order for the supply chain to succeed, the lifescience firm will benefit from the 
cooperation of a food manufacturer interested in adding a GM functional food to their 
product offering. It is likely too big of a risk for the lifescience firm to come up with an 
idea and hope that there will be an interested food manufacturer when it comes time to 
market it. For this reason, the agreement between the food manufacturer and the 
lifescience firm will take place early in the development phases. This was the case in the 
agreement between Zeneca and Safeway/Sainsburys in the case of the GM tomato puree. 
Also, because of the extra transaction costs and research costs involved in the 
development of these products, the lifescience firm might allow more control to the food 
manufacturer if they invest directly in the process. For these reasons, it is unlikely that a 
simple marketing alliance between the lifescience firm and the food manufacturer would 
be feasible. 
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A generalization could be made of a hypothetical situation involving a 
relationship between a lifescience firm and food manufacturer for the production of a GM 
functional food. Recall the observations of Oxley (1997) in chapter two. In the case of 
observation (1), there would potentially be an agreement regarding a specific product (the 
GM functional food itself). There could be a single product offered through the 
agreement, or a multitude of uses for a raw material, so the possibilities for observation 
(2) are hard to predict. Most likely the transaction will take place over a wide geographic 
area, considering the level of international agricultural trade that currently exists for most 
products. Regarding observation (4), the parties probably are involved in few alliances 
between one another with other products. From this generalization it is apparent that there 
would be a strong tendency for more hierarchical relationships, or joint ventures within 
the supply chain for GM functional foods. Within the joint venture there could be good 
communication and the incentive to maximize joint profits which would simplify the 
bilateral bargaining solution. The joint venture would ensure the lifescience firm that the 
food manufacturer was interested in the product, and lower the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour at a later date. For the food manufacturer, the joint venture would give them 
the opportunity to have a stronger influence concerning the products that are produced. It 
might also give them the opportunity to ensure that they receive a tangible benefit from 
processing the GM functional foods.  
Overall, the supply chain will be challenging and complicated.  A joint venture 
between the lifescience firm and the food manufacturer could be an efficient mechanism 
for the supply chain to function; however, the food manufacturer might not want to enter 
a joint venture with a lifescience firm because of the wish to maintain their brand image. 
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Cooperation between the lifescience firm and the food manufacturer could be perceived 
as an added risk to the food manufacturers brand image because of the negative image of 
the lifescience firms with some consumer and environmental groups. 
The highest level of coordination between the lifescience firm and food 
manufacturer would be if the two firms merged to become one through vertical 
integration. Klein (1978) stated that the probability of vertical integration increases as the 
level of quasi-rents increase. Following this, the higher the expected rents available for 
distribution in the supply chain are the higher the probability for vertical integration. 
Intuitively, this would be because negotiating in a bilateral monopoly reduces the amount 
of rent available from the optimum. Williamson (1971) states that in cases where the 
bargaining costs become higher than the cost of integration, the firms would be expected 
to vertically integrate. In the case of GM functional foods, vertical integration would be 
an unlikely solution because each firm produces a number of different products that 
would not be more efficiently produced if the firms were combined. The result would 
likely be diseconomies of scope where it is more costly for a single firm to produce all the 
products, than if the two firms remain separate (Mansfield, 1996). As a result the 
management costs of operating an integrated lifescience/food manufacturing firm would 
likely be prohibitive. 
In some cases, similar to that of the NewLeaf potato, the food retailing/restaurant 
sector should also be considered. The food manufacturers will have to take into 
consideration the reactions of the end-users before introducing a new product. Contracts 
will be made between the two sides for use. The difference between GM functional foods 
and the NewLeaf potato case is the fact that the GM functional food will be identity 
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preserved. The NewLeaf potato case showed that restaurants can influence the success or 
failure of a product through a simple decision to go GM-free. A similar scenario was 
shown in the GM tomato puree case and retailers making the decision that they wanted 
their own-branded products to be GM-free. This shows that the willingness of the 
restaurants and food retailers to use a product will directly influence its success. 
 
5.4  Potential products  
The potential products that could be introduced as GM functional foods deserve 
mention. It is valuable to note the GM products that have been successful in the past, 
along with the failures. The successful GM foods have been those that are manufactured 
and used as ingredients in other foods, rather than foods themselves. Examples of 
successes include soybeans, corn and canola. One of the main products extracted from 
these commodities is the oil, which is used in processed foods and for deep-frying. Also, 
especially in corn and soybeans, the seed is also used for animal feed. In both cases the 
food is not normally directly consumed. 
The failures have been foods that are consumed directly. Examples are potatoes 
and tomatoes. These seem to be met with increased consumer backlash. Although there is 
value from adding functional attributes in these foods, they seem to have an increased 
risk to the parties involved. For this reason, it would be expected that the initial GM 
functional foods would not likely be foods that are consumed directly. Lifescience firms 
appear to be focussing their research on foods that are already available as GM varieties. 
Monsantos decision to eliminate their NatureMark division to focus on their core 
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product offerings is a good example. Monsanto lists several functional products in the 
early development phase, all of which involve soybeans (Fraley, 2005).  
 
 
5.5  Summary  
This chapter begins by discussing the implications of the three factors that are 
used in this thesis to explain the potential for a set back to the commercialization of GM 
functional foods. On their own, government regulatory uncertainty, consumer aversion 
and brand image, or access to intellectual property could potentially cause a set back. 
When these factors are combined together, the potential for set back increases 
substantially. 
Next, the supply chain structures that would facilitate efficient vertical 
relationships are discussed. Institutions such as an intellectual property clearinghouse 
might address a possible problem of missing institutions. Also, joint ventures between 
lifescience and food manufacturing firms could allow them to maximize joint profits. 
This could lead to the introduction of GM functional foods being mutually beneficial, 
which is necessary to the food manufacturer in order to expand their brand. Overall, there 
will be closer vertical coordination between all parties of the supply chain. In order for 
investment into functional foods to be justifiable for lifescience firms and food 
manufacturers, the extra costs in the supply chain will have to be covered by a price 
premium in the retail market. 
Finally, information about past successes and failures in agricultural 
biotechnology are used to discuss potential products for future development. It seems that 
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a product like healthy oil soybeans might have the highest potential. Lifescience firms 
realize that because soybeans make up a relatively large proportion of crop production, 
the market for new varieties of soybeans is large compared to most other crops. Also, as a 
result of the high adoption of GM soybeans by producers, the food manufacturers have 
had little choice but to accept GM soybeans. GM soybeans are processed into oil that is 
not normally eaten on its own, and the GM protein does not remain in tact in the oil. As a 
result of these factors, the GM soybeans have been accepted more readily than GM 
potatoes or tomatoes, which were consumed directly and produced on a small scale. 
The next chapter provides a summary of the thesis, as well as some final 
conclusions. It also provides an explanation of the short-comings of the thesis, combined 
with recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1  Summary  
This thesis begins by stating that there is potential for a set back in the 
commercialization of GM functional foods. These foods, with additional health benefits 
beyond normal nutritional value, have been consistently referred to as the benefit that 
consumers will receive from biotechnology. However, government regulatory 
uncertainty, consumer aversion and brand image issues, and access to intellectual 
property were listed as factors that could potentially contribute to the delay. 
The first objective was to identify the three factors and explain how they 
contribute to a potential for the set back to commercial development of GM functional 
foods. This was completed in chapter two. The second objective was to develop a 
theoretical model of each of the three factors. In chapter three, three separate models are 
used to show the effect that the factors have in the contribution to industry set backs. It 
also attempts to tie the factors together using a model of the vertical market. Finally, the 
third objective was to use the information and results from these two chapters, in 
combination with issues in the case studies in chapter four to make inferences regarding 
the potential supply chain structures. The addition of an intellectual property 
clearinghouse, and the formation of joint ventures between lifescience and food 
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manufacturing firms are specific examples of institutional and supply chain changes. 
Overall, the supply chain for GM functional foods would be expected to be more 
vertically coordinated than conventional agri-food supply chains. The result could be 
similar to the supply chain of Nexera Canola which is discussed in chapter four.  
 
6.2  Limitations and recommendations for further research  
The primary objective of this thesis was to provide explanations of the three 
factors that could potentially cause a set back to commercialization of GM functional 
foods and tie them together. One limitation of attempting to work with all three factors 
was that it was not possible to conduct a deeper analysis of key factors due to time 
constraints. As a result, the recommendations for further research include more in depth 
research of specific factors.  
The first recommendation is that research be conducted in more depth on food 
manufacturers preferences regarding the risk they are willing to take in expanding their 
brand. Much of the literature regarding agricultural biotechnology and consumers has 
focussed on individual consumer preference. Although this is important, it is the food 
manufacturer that makes the decision on whether to expand their brand to include new 
products. Expanded research concerning food manufacturers would be valuable not only 
for analyzing GM functional foods, but also new food introductions in general. 
Further, in regards to the heterogeneous consumer model in section 3.3, it is 
assumed that the market is competitive. In reality the market could have several different 
structures. Initially the GM functional food manufacturer might have monopolistic 
power, similar to that shown in the vertical market (Figures 3.1, 3.8 and 3.9). It was also 
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assumed that the national brand introduces the GM functional food. To adapt this model 
to be used in combination with the full vertical market model, it would have to be 
adapted to use strategic pricing rather than competitive. It would also be useful to analyse 
a situation where a new entrant to the industry introduces the GM functional food. 
Another limitation is the use of hypothetical values in the simulation analysis. 
This study was limited to hypothetical values because it is analysing products that are not 
on the market. A recommendation would be to perform more in depth research and 
calculate more realistic values for the variables using consumer attitudes towards brands 
and food quality collected through stated preference surveys and/or revealed preference 
market data if new products are introduced. Also, it would be valuable to expand the 
model to include costs. The demand function for GM functional foods could easily be 
derived from the market shares24 of the types of foods. When the demand and supply are 
combined, the scenarios necessary for the GM functional food to be successful could be 
calculated. The model could then be shocked by changes to the expected profit because 
of regulatory uncertainty.  It would also be valuable to include a time variable into the 
simulation analysis to show the effects that time to regulatory approval has on the 
successful commercialization of a functional food. Also, the effect of increases in 
transaction costs and reductions to demand could be examined. 
Although the problem of multiple bilateral monopolies was mentioned in the 
thesis, it was not explicitly modelled. If a single bilateral monopoly negotiation leads to a 
sub-optimal solution, a supply chain with multiple bilateral monopolies could come to an 
agreement that is far from the optimum. Paradoxically, a supply chain with multiple 
                                                        
24 Recall that demand for an individual product in this model is equal to market share multiplied by the total 
demand for that type of food. 
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bilateral monopolies would likely need more rent to distribute in order to satisfy the firms 
involved. This leads to a potential hold-up problem, where there is no solution to make 
the supply chain work. Further modelling of this problem would be useful and possibly 
fill a void in the literature. 
Finally, there are some interesting policy implications that emerge when 
discussing functional foods, especially in Canada, where health care is publicly funded. 
Malla et al. (2005) estimated the savings to Canadas health care system resulting from a 
conversion to Natreon canola oil to be CDN $1.12 billion per year because of a reduction 
in cardiovascular disease. There may be a market failure because consumers must pay a 
premium to consume the functional foods. In a publicly funded health care system, some 
of the costs of poor health are borne by the taxpayers. The policy implications of this 
problem as it relates to functional foods in general could be discussed in future research. 
Malla et al. (2005) recommend product labelling legislation to reduce information 
asymmetry, and also a pigovian tax on unhealthy foods or subsidies on healthy foods to 
encourage consumption. These issues were not discussed in this thesis, but would be an 
interesting area of future research.   
 
6.3  Conclusions  
After examining the government regulatory uncertainty, consumer aversion and 
brand equity issues, and the issues related to gaining access to intellectual property, the 
conclusion can be made that all three factors exist throughout the supply chain for GM 
functional foods. When the explanations and theoretical model of the three factors were 
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examined separately there was evidence that they could lead to a delay to the 
commercialization of GM functional foods. 
When these factors are combined, there is a lot of uncertainty for stakeholders 
within the supply chain to take into consideration. There is also evidence that the 
lifescience firms that specialize in agricultural biotechnology have realized that it might 
be more valuable to make modest claims. A look at the literature provided on the 
websites of firms like Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-bred International (DuPont) shows that 
the products currently being developed are for simple improvements such as soybeans 
that produce oil that does not have to be hydrogenated.  
Overall, the commercialization of GM functional foods will be a challenge to all 
involved. In order to compensate those within the supply chain for dealing with increased 
government regulatory uncertainty, high transaction costs, risk to firms brand equity and 
specialized methods of production and handling; the consumers are going to be asked to 
pay a premium for the food. For consumers to be willing to pay this premium, the product 
will have to provide a valuable health trait that is not available in a conventional form at a 
lower price. The balance between the extra costs and premium price will be important to 
avoid set backs to commercialization. In the case of the food manufacturer, the benefit 
will have to be high in order to take a risk expanding their brand to include a GM 
functional food that has the potential to lead to controversy.  
These factors combine to generate a realistic view of the potential for agricultural 
biotechnology to contribute to the health of consumers. The lifescience firms have the 
technical capability to develop foods that provide consumers with large health benefits. 
However, the factors contributing to the set back have led to less drastic goals in the 
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development of agri-food innovations. At least in the foreseeable future, consumers will 
not receive the benefits from agricultural biotechnology that were promised at the outset 
of this agricultural biotechnology revolution. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPLANATION OF SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
 
 
The simulations were performed in Microsoft Excel using the Solver function, as 
was explained previously. Prior to the three good market, which includes the GM tomato 
paste, a two good scenario is developed in both the 50-50 and 70-30 scenarios. The 
variables and parameters from equations 9 and 10 were used in the two good set up. The 
market share values (SA and SS) were also set to be equivalent to equations 9 and 10. 
In each case, solver was set up to give the desired market share of conventional 
tomato paste (either 0.5 or 0.7). The market share of the substitute also changed as 
desired with this command to sum to 1.0. The tomato paste prices were inserted into the 
model. The base utilities and discount factors were the cells that were changed in order to 
provide the desired market shares.  
Restrictions were put into place in order to obtain results that were consistent.  
First, the sum of SA and SS was set equal to 1 and the value of the respective market 
shares were restricted to be between 0 and 1. The values of the base utilities ( AU  and 
SU ) were restricted to be positive. Finally the discount factors  λ  and  γ were restricted 
to be between 0 and 1. The results of the Solver model are displayed in Table 3.1. 
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These results were then inserted into a model with three goods. This model used 
the variables and parameters from equations 12, 14 and 15. Throughout the two scenarios 
using three goods, the values of SU , AU , PS, PA,  λ  and  γ  were kept constant. The 
variables FU , PF and  µ  were changed in Solver to attain the desired market share (SF) 
of 0.1. The other market shares of the conventional and substitute tomato pastes (SA and 
SS) adjusted accordingly so the three market shares summed to 1. 
The same restrictions were used in the three good scenario as were used in the 
two good cases. However, there were additional restrictions required to obtain a solution. 
The base utility of the functional tomato paste ( FU ) was restricted to be greater than 0. 
The discount factor ( µ ) and the market share (SF) of the functional food were restricted 
to be between 0 and 1. The discount factor of the functional food ( µ ) was restricted to be 
the same or less than that of the conventional tomato paste ( λ ), and the base utility of the 
functional tomato paste ( FU )was restricted to be at least as large as the base utility of the 
conventional tomato paste ( AU ). 
After the base situation was developed that provided the desired functional tomato 
paste share of 0.1, the sensitivity was performed simply by changing the desired variable 
or parameter and observing the effect on the respective market shares. In situations where 
the test was to determine what value would give a market share (SF) of 0 (Situations 4, 6, 
9, 13, 15, 18), the variable of interest was set to change in Solver so that the value of SF 
was 0. 
